Residential Foreclosures\u27 Impact on Nearby Single-Family Residential Properties;a New Approach to the Spatial and Temporal Dimensions by Kobie, Timothy F.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
ETD Archive
2009
Residential Foreclosures' Impact on Nearby Single-
Family Residential Properties;a New Approach to
the Spatial and Temporal Dimensions
Timothy F. Kobie
Cleveland State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive
Part of the Urban Studies and Planning Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in ETD Archive by an
authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kobie, Timothy F., "Residential Foreclosures' Impact on Nearby Single-Family Residential Properties;a New Approach to the Spatial
and Temporal Dimensions" (2009). ETD Archive. 165.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive/165
 RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURES’ IMPACT ON NEARBY SINGLE-FAMILY 
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES: A NEW APPROACH TO THE SPATIAL AND 
TEMPORAL DIMENSIONS 
 
TIMOTHY F. KOBIE 
 
Bachelor of Arts in Sociology 
Case Western Reserve University 
January, 2003 
 
Master of Urban Planning, Design and Development 
Cleveland State University 
May, 2005 
 
 
submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN URBAN STUDIES AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
at the 
CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY 
July, 2009 
 ii 
This dissertation has been approved 
for the Department of URBAN STUDIES 
and the College of Graduate Studies by 
 
 
___________________________________________________ 
Dissertation Chairperson, Brian A. Mikelbank 
_____________________________ 
Department & Date 
 
___________________________________________________ 
W. Dennis Keating 
_____________________________ 
Department & Date 
 
___________________________________________________ 
Alan Reichert 
____________________________ 
Department & Date 
 iii 
RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURES’ IMPACT ON NEARBY SINGLE-FAMLY 
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES: A NEW APPROACH TO THE SPATIAL AND 
TEMPORAL DIMENSIONS 
 
TIMOTHY F. KOBIE 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation analyzes the impact that foreclosures have on neighboring property 
values.  It focuses on foreclosures’ impact based upon face blocks, not straight-line 
distances and it also incorporates time and the use of spatial statistics.  Findings from this 
study show that properties in the foreclosure process longer have a greater negative 
impact on nearby property values than properties with more recent foreclosure filings.  
The first negative impact is not seen until a year after the filing.  Therefore, policy 
responses need to be as swift as possible in preventing any negative impact on 
neighboring property values and should not focus on extending the length of time a 
property is in foreclosure. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As researchers devote more time to studying the current home mortgage crisis, the 
information available regarding the current situation in the United States begins to 
provide a more complete understanding of the causes and impacts.  The problems can 
range from its impact on a national scale, to regional implications and all the way down 
to individual impacts on families affected by foreclosure.  Apparent from this recurring 
research is that foreclosures are not uniformly distributed across the United States.  Rates 
of foreclosure differ from the Northeast to the Western United States and there are also 
differences from state to state.  Even within states, there is variation from region to 
region, municipality to municipality, and from neighborhood to neighborhood.  Despite 
these variations, the mortgage crisis appears to be impacting all Americans in some way, 
especially now that it is a full-scale economic recession. 
The current situation has drawn many comparisons to the Great Depression of the 
1930s.  It was during this time period that the federal government first took an active role 
in creating policy around homeownership.  Prior to the Great Depression, the federal 
government limited its involvement in homeownership to farm housing for the most part.  
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With the crash of the stock market in 1929 and the economic crisis that followed, many 
borrowers could not afford to continue to pay for the mortgage or pay the “bullet” or 
“balloon” payment at the end of the loan terms.  The federal government was essentially 
forced to step in and save homeowners from foreclosure as well as save the thrifts that 
made the loans.  The first piece of legislation was the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 
1932.  This placed thrifts under federal supervision for the first time.  Quickly following 
this act were the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 and the National Housing Act of 1934.  
The latter act created the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (Harriss, 
1951; Lea, 1996; Carliner, 1998).  Many borrowers were protected from foreclosure and 
had their loans refinanced.  While the main purpose of these programs could be seen as a 
way to save the financial system at the time, it also expanded homeownership. 
Another important part of the 1934 National Housing Act was the creation of the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA).  Mortgage lending had slowed dramatically due 
to poor economic conditions.  The FHA provided government-backed insurance for 
mortgages, stimulating lending, home purchasing and home building.  With a large 
portion of unemployment occurring in construction related occupations, insuring 
mortgages not only spurred homeownership, but it also served as a way to stimulate the 
building industry.  The focus on new construction would have unintended consequences 
later on in the century.   
While FHA is often attributed with the creation of long-term, amortizing loans, 
loans of that type were used quite frequently prior to the Great Depression.  The real 
innovation was increasing the loan-to-value ratio to 80 percent (Colean, 1975; Lloyd, 
1994; Carliner, 1998).  That was also the only true liberal feature of FHA program 
 3 
requirements.  Appraisals were strict, as were building and construction standards.  These 
stricter measures often excluded existing housing, once again promoted new construction.  
FHA insured mortgages were also required to be in homogenous neighborhoods.  If this 
is coupled with the focus on new construction, FHA was essentially subsidizing housing 
for middle and upper class whites in the suburbs.  Racial discrimination was a part of 
FHA until the early 1960s when President Kennedy issued an executive order for equal 
opportunity in FHA loans.  The same became true for conventional loans after the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968.  In order to help with the enforcement of such policies, Congress 
passed the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 and the Community Reinvestment 
Act of 1977.  After this policy change, FHA loan recipients tended to be lower-income 
borrowers or minority borrowers (Carliner, 1998).  Since the 1970s, these loans have also 
been more likely to result in foreclosure than conventional loans (Immergluck & Smith, 
2005). 
Another program that originated during the depression was the Federal National 
Mortgage Association, most commonly known as Fannie Mae.  The organization was 
created in 1938 as a government agency that would support FHA lending by purchasing 
FHA loans.  When Fannie Mae would purchase a FHA loan, FHA would then in turn 
have more money to lend.  Fannie Mae was not initially extremely active in the 
secondary market, as insurance companies were the largest purchasers of mortgages in 
the secondary market (Carliner, 1998).  In 1968, as part of the Housing and Urban 
Development Act, Fannie Mae was privatized, becoming a government-sponsored 
enterprise.  Also part of the act was the creation of the Government National Mortgage 
Association or GNMA.  GNMA stepped into the government role left by the now private 
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Fannie Mae.  Two years later, the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 authorized 
Fannie Mae to purchase conventional loans.  Just as this provided more money for FHA 
to lend in the 40s and 50s, it now provides more money for conventional lenders.  A 
“competitor” for Fannie Mae was created as well in the form of the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Company or Freddie Mac.  This system of securitizing mortgages in the 
secondary market fell apart in 2006 and 2007 when too many high-risk loans were being 
incorporated in the bundle of mortgages purchased.  When those loans were defaulted 
upon, the investments went bad.  It should be noted that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
were not the only secondary market players to have problems once the subprime 
mortgage market started to fail. 
In addition to the programs described above, the federal government has also had 
other small-scale programs and subsidies, but the impact has been relatively weak and 
most of the programs are no longer relevant.  This applies to programs under the Johnson, 
Clinton and Bush administrations among others.  A non-housing policy that has had a 
much greater impact on homeownership is the tax code, which is administered by the 
Treasury and IRS, not a housing agency.  While probably not initially intended to support 
homeownership, the ability to deduct mortgage interest and property taxes from federal 
income taxes serves as an incentive to own a home.  It also encourages the purchase of 
the most expensive home possible.  The more mortgage interest that is paid by the 
borrower, the greater the deduction.  The same can be said for property taxes, which will 
be greater for a more expensive home.  For those with a moderately priced home, the 
mortgage interest paid may not be large enough to deduct.  This is another situation 
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where the “housing policy” is skewed towards newly constructed homes at the urban 
fringe, as these tend to be the most expensive homes. 
Another non-housing program that has had a profound effect on housing 
development in the United States was the Interstate Highway Act of 1956.  Originally 
passed as a defense measure, the act had the unintended consequence of allowing 
households to locate further from the central city without increasing transportation times.  
Areas that would have been considered “remote” became accessible.  When that is 
coupled with FHA policy of insuring new construction, more and more housing was built 
on the fringe.  There were few if any policies devoted to housing in the city core. 
When looking at this brief history of homeownership policy in the United States, 
two trends become apparent.  The first is that the federal government only intervenes in 
the housing industry when absolutely necessary.  They have largely left it untouched.  
When left to the private sector, the housing industry has focused on new construction of 
detached single-family dwellings simply as a manner of profitability.  This is backed up 
by trends in homeownership rates, which have increased gradually since 1965, with the 
most notable dips occurring in the early 1980s and the most recent one, starting in 2004 
(See Figure 1).  Secondly, when the federal government does become involved in the 
housing market, they tend to focus on single-family residential new construction just like 
the private sector.  FHA, Fannie Mae, the tax code and other policies all provide the 
greatest incentives for single-family homeownership. 
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Figure 1. Homeownership Rate in the United States 1965-2007(Q4) 
Source: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/hvs.html, U.S. Census Bureau 
 
The housing system in place since the 1980s, including the private and public 
sectors, seemed strong.  Homeownership rates were climbing.  Unfortunately, some 
segments of the population were still being left out of what many view as an important 
part of the American Dream, homeownership.  Those most notably lagging behind in 
homeownership rates were minorities and low-income households.  Conventional lenders 
tended to only make loans to the most creditworthy applicants and government resources 
were limited in providing loans to those left out of the conventional market.  This left a 
gap in the lending industry. 
Subprime lenders filled this void.  Subprime loans are made to borrowers with 
less than “A” credit.  These borrowers have some type of blemish on their credit, making 
them a riskier venture for the lender.  Therefore, the lender has to make the terms of the 
loan reflect this risk.  Borrowers in the prime market generally have an interest rate near 
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or at the lowest possible level when the loan in made.  Other than that, there are usually 
few or no other loan terms to account for risk.  Prime borrowers are viewed as a very low 
risk for default and foreclosure.  Subprime loans have a higher interest rate than prime 
loans.  A loan with an interest rate three percent above Treasury notes is considered 
subprime according to HMDA.  There are often other features that make the loan cost 
more for the borrower, which provides more security for the lender.  These can come in 
the form of points, prepayment penalties or other attributes.  Despite the greater risk, 
these loans were securitized in the secondary market with little trouble.  Loans considered 
risky were bundled with a much larger portion of low-risk loans.  If a risky loan were to 
fail, the investment as a whole would still be strong.  It appeared that there was a way to 
increase minority and low-income homeownership, while providing investment 
opportunities for other Americans with little help from the federal government. 
Before continuing, it seems prudent to provide a little more detail about the 
securitization process.  This should make the discussion to follow easier to understand.  
While mortgage securitization is itself a complex process, a simple outline is sufficient 
for the purposes of this dissertation.  The process starts when a loan is made.  This can 
occur between a borrower and a mortgage broker, borrower and a bank, or a borrower 
and another loan granting entity.  Most banks or other lenders do not hold the loans that 
they make.  While holding the loans and collecting the payments from borrowers would 
turn a profit, it is a slow process.  The loan originator would rather sell the loan to another 
company, possibly a government sponsored enterprise if the loan meets certain standards, 
who will then collect payments on the loan.  This leaves the loan originator to go out and 
make another loan to another borrower.  The process does not stop here.  Companies or 
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groups that purchase loans turn around and offer bundles of loans as investment 
opportunities.  Bundles would generally have a large number of prime loans and a 
smaller number of subprime loans.  By bundling loans in this manner, the risk to the 
“final” investor is limited.  Bundles with a higher number of subprime loans would have 
a higher risk, but potentially a higher reward as well. 
Subprime loans typically do not meet the standards of government sponsored 
enterprises and are therefore not purchased by those agencies.  Private groups that 
provide mortgage-backed securities for investors fill this gap.  Ashcraft and Schuermann 
(2008) note that until recently, these private companies typically were involved in the 
origination of mortgages and the issuance of mortgage-backed securities that conformed 
to the standards of government sponsored enterprises.  However, by 2006, these private 
companies originated $1.48 trillion in mortgage loans, which was forty-five percent 
greater than loans originated by government sponsored enterprises.  In terms of the 
issuance of mortgage-backed securities, private companies issued over $1 trillion 
compared to just over $900 billion by government sponsored enterprises.  That amounts 
to a difference of fourteen percent.  As these private groups experienced growth, the 
share of loans for government sponsored enterprises shrank.  It appeared that the private 
sector was more than able to handle the mortgage industry.        
Since the system was so successful, it became possible to bundle in more 
subprime loans with prime loans, while only increasing perceived risk slightly.  Most of 
those borrowers with subprime loans were paying their mortgages.  Around the turn of 
the century, there were some hints that the system was not as perfect as it seemed.  Some 
areas were starting to see increased foreclosure rates, but nothing extreme.  House prices 
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were also continuing to climb, which was an important part of the process as loan-to-
value ratios rose above 90 percent.  Other types of loan products started to become more 
prevalent.  These products can be thought of as exotic loans (Immergluck, 2008).  
Included in this group could be no money down loans and stated income/stated assets 
loans.  Adjustable rate loans also became more common.  The housing industry and 
lending system continued to accept riskier and riskier products as they continued to be 
successful.  Borrowers were not defaulting and the secondary market was purchasing 
these loans.  Both borrowers and lenders were responsible for supporting such a system.  
Borrowers might stretch their incomes or misrepresent their ability to pay in order get a 
bigger, better home.  Lenders would often push borrowers into a riskier loan or pressure 
them to refinance.  As long as the loan is made and then sold in the secondary market, the 
lender is profiting. 
Eventually, the risk became too great and some of these loans started to fail and 
foreclosures rose.  Failing loans meant that the investments made in the secondary market 
were also failing.  This in turn had a negative impact on the economy and as workers lost 
hours or jobs or wages, the process started all over again, creating a cycle of foreclosure, 
economic downturn and falling house prices.  Foreclosures hit certain parts of the country 
earlier than others.  Ohio was a state already having a tough time economically.  This was 
especially true in Northeast Ohio, home to Cuyahoga County and the City of Cleveland.  
With a weak regional economy and stagnant house prices, Cuyahoga County was one of 
the first counties in the country to be hit hard by foreclosures.   
While unfortunate for many homeowners, this makes Cuyahoga County an 
excellent place to study the effects of foreclosure, which is what I will do for the 
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remainder of the dissertation.  Previous researchers have studied the problem using a 
straight-line distance to measure proximity between foreclosures and for-sale properties.  
While this method is efficient and effective, it is not the most accurate way in which the 
process of foreclosures’ impact on property values can be modeled.  I utilize the face 
block to assess proximity.  Face blocks are real urban spaces and are a better geography 
for measuring any impact, as I explain in the literature review and methodology sections.  
I incorporate time as well.  This aspect of the foreclosure problem has been largely 
unexamined in the literature.  I also test for spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity, 
which has not been done by previous researchers.  The main research question remains 
the same.  What impact do foreclosures have on nearby property values?  However, in 
this dissertation, the impact is measured within a face block, not within a certain distance 
of the property.  In addition to the main research question, there are also two others.  
What role does time play in the impact of foreclosures on nearby properties?  And, Is 
there still a negative impact when spatial dependence and heterogeneity are controlled 
for? 
In order to answer these questions, I first start with a brief theoretical background 
using Tiebout (1956), Rosen (1974) and Lancaster (1966).  That section is followed by a 
literature review.  The literature review section covers the process of foreclosure and 
current policies aimed at combating the problem of foreclosure.  Policies can be found at 
the local, state and federal level.  The literature review also discusses the effects that 
foreclosure can have on a neighborhood.  These can range from an increase in crime to 
racial transition.  I am interested in examining the impact that foreclosure have on nearby 
property values due to its effect on a large number of stakeholders: neighbors, school 
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districts and cities to name a few.  Therefore, the last part of the literature review focuses 
on what previous researchers have done.  Through this process I identify several areas of 
the literature on this topic that are under developed.  In the methods section, I outline how 
I am going to address these deficiencies and the data section describes that data that I will 
use for my analysis.  Fittingly, the results section discusses the results from the models 
that I use to analyze the problem and the discussion section outlines implications from 
my findings. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THEORY 
 
 While the process of foreclosure, to be discussed in detail later, truly starts when a 
household cannot pay their mortgage or the taxes associated with the property, a 
foreclosure does not occur unless a home purchase takes place first.  For many 
Americans, owning a home is part of the American Dream.  In addition to joining or 
purchasing a piece of the American Dream, households are also purchasing a bundle of 
attributes that includes goods and services provided by their local municipality as well as 
the various characteristics of the house and the neighborhood.  Tiebout (1956) was the 
first to outline the concept that households move between communities to the place that 
offers the goods and services that best align with the needs of the household.  Through 
the process of choosing a community and moving there, households are attempting to 
maximize their utility.  They are also revealing their true preferences.  Their willingness 
to pay is reflected in the price of the home they buy.  Prior to Tiebout (1956), scholars 
viewed the provision of goods and services by the government as a “free rider” problem 
(Samuelson, 1954).  That is, individuals and households hide their true preferences in 
order to pay less for government-provided goods and services.  This is true for the federal 
government and the services that they provide.  However, as Tiebout (1956) explained, 
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this line of thinking is flawed when discussing local governments.  At the local level, 
households have a choice of various municipalities offering different sets of goods and 
services.  When making a location decision, households will choose the municipality that 
has the service set that most closely matches their preferences.  Those in need of high 
public services will live in a city with a high level of service and likewise, higher taxes.  
Other households with lower requirements for services will live in communities with 
lower services and lower taxes.   
 Public goods and services are not the only attributes in the bundle that a 
household acquires when they purchase a home.  Also in the bundle are individual 
characteristics of the home that is bought.  The sale price is reflective of those 
characteristics and the public goods and services, with each attribute having an effect on 
the household’s utility.  The goal is to maximize utility.  Lancaster’s (1966) model of 
consumer theory posits that goods are members of different categories and that goods are 
purchased in combinations within the constraint of a household’s budget.  The 
combination that each household chooses maximizes their utility for their preferences and 
budget constraint.  For example, a household that prefers organic food will allocate more 
in their budget for food, leaving less for other purchases like clothing and entertainment.  
Likewise, if name brand or designer clothes are important to a household, they will spend 
more money on clothes and less on other goods and services.  This theory works well for 
consumer goods, but for a durable good like housing, it is lacking.  Rosen’s (1974) model 
is slightly different.  Instead of purchasing a combination of goods to maximize utility, 
households choose from a range of brands or types and the good is consumed discretely.  
Synthesizing these theories, the hedonic price model can be derived for housing.  The 
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price of a house is a function of its individual characteristics, neighborhood 
characteristics and location characteristics, which includes municipal goods and services.  
Each household purchases a home that maximizes their utility through different 
combinations of the attributes that make up the price of the house, all within the 
constraint of a budget.   
It is important to note that in these theories, all players are assumed to have 
perfect information.  However, as many real world applications prove, perfect 
information is not always present.  In the case of purchasing a home, imperfect 
information can manifest itself as a household misjudges its budget constraint.  The 
household may not include taxes or insurance in their budget, both of which are 
important aspects of housing costs.  They also may not set aside money for any 
emergencies or unforeseen costs.  Besides the possibility of not including certain costs, a 
household may include extra income.  They may be counting on an increase in income 
due to a raise or change of job that may or may not actually occur.  There is also the 
possibility that fraud occurred at some point during the home buying process.  These 
types of misinformation can be troublesome and potentially lead to a foreclosure.   
 Regardless of how accurately a household assesses their budget constraint for 
housing costs, the first step towards foreclosure may be the decision to purchase a home.  
However, as purchasing a home is generally considered a positive event, it is more 
accurate to identify the start of the foreclosure process as some type of disruption in the 
households’ lives.  There may have a layoff, divorce, or other factor that affects the 
household’s ability to pay their mortgage.  Households make the decision to buy a home 
for various reasons, some more common than others.  An ideal prevalent across nearly all 
 15 
home-buying decisions is the prominent place that a single-family home has in the 
American Dream.  Owning ones’ home is a sign of success, individuality, freedom and 
responsibility.  Additionally, there are financial incentives for home ownership.  Carasso, 
Bell, Olsen and Steuerle (2005) note that most housing assistance is delivered through the 
tax code.  The tax deduction for home mortgage interest rewards the purchase of the most 
expensive home with the greatest deduction.  Smaller, less expensive homes often do not 
provide homeowners any tax deduction.  With households striving to achieve the 
American Dream and ample financial incentives to own a home, U.S. Census Bureau data 
shows that the homeownership rate has gradually been increasing since 1965, reaching a 
high of 69.7 percent in 2004.  This trend can be seen in Figure 1.  After 2004, the 
homeownership rate declines.  The drop is slight from 2004 to 2005 and 2005 to 2006.  
However, from 2006 to 2007, the homeownership rate falls back below 68 percent.  This 
is due in large part to the high number of risky loans that were originated prior to 2006.  
Those loans then failed, resulting in default and eventually foreclosure.  When the loans 
were made, it was seen as an opportunity to expand access to homeownership to a larger 
segment of the population and include more people in the American Dream. 
In pursuit of the American Dream, a young couple may just have gotten married 
and decide to buy a house instead of renting.  Another household may be growing 
through birth or adoption and decide that they may need a larger place to live.  There is 
also the possibility that someone in the household has gotten a new job or a promotion 
and the household can now afford a “better” place to live.  Whatever the reason is, the 
decision is made and the household then begins to search for a house.  Different 
households will value the attributes of a home in a way that will allow them to maximize 
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their utility (Lancaster, 1966; Rosen, 1974; Tiebout, 1956).  The young couple mentioned 
previously may not place much importance on the number of bedrooms or the quality of 
the school district, but possibly proximity to work and entertainment.  A household that is 
growing will need a certain number of bedrooms and baths.  If the children are school 
age, school quality will be very important.  Other households will value attributes and 
services according to their needs and what will maximize utility.  Households interested 
in city amenities may want a good recreation center as well as a location near parks and 
open space.  The examples are nearly endless, but the point illustrated in the above 
examples is that each household, after deciding to purchase a home, will look for one that 
best matches their needs and preferences to maximize utility within a budget. 
 The budget of a household is a very important factor when purchasing a home and 
it is ultimately a major factor in the foreclosure process as well.  There are two common 
rules of thumb traditionally used in mortgage lending to limit how much a household can 
borrow and how much they can spend on housing costs.  The first, related to housing 
costs, is that a household should spend thirty percent of their income or less on housing.  
The merits of this constraint will not be discussed here, as there are many advantages and 
disadvantages to the “rule”.  What is important is that mortgage lenders use this to help 
determine how much house a household can afford.  The other rule of thumb deals with 
the ratio of debt to income.  Mortgage and other types of lenders have traditionally 
limited this ratio to thirty-nine percent.  For example, households may already have other 
types of debt when they go to buy a home.  Many households have car payments and 
credit card debt.  Younger households may have student loans that they are currently 
repaying.  These other debts take up a portion of that thirty-nine percent and the rest can 
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be used to borrow money for a mortgage, which traditionally includes principle, interest, 
taxes and insurance.  Within the constraint of their budget and mortgage lending 
principles, households attempt to get the most for their money, thereby maximizing 
utility. 
 Despite these rules of thumb, there can be substantial leeway in which a 
household can maneuver to get the best possible combination of attributes in a home.  In 
recent years, more innovative and flexible mortgage products have become available.  
These products are much different and have the possibility of greater risk than the 
traditional thirty-year fixed rate mortgage that first appeared after the Great Depression 
(Gramlich, 2007).  Instead of fixed rate mortgages, there are adjustable rate mortgages 
(ARMs).  An ARM allows households to get a lower interest rate initially while taking a 
gamble that rates will remain low, as the interest rate on the loan will adjust after a 
certain amount of time.  If interest rates have increased between the origination of the 
loan and the time of adjustment, the household will see their monthly mortgage payment 
increase due to the higher interest rate.  They may or may not be able to afford this rise in 
housing costs.  In an attempt to maximize utility, the household may have been paying 
thirty percent of their income at the original interest rate and the new rate pushes them 
above what they have allocated for housing costs and are thus unable to afford the new 
payment.  This may result in a foreclosure if some type of remedy cannot be reached 
between the lender and the borrower.  The borrower may also attempt to sell their home 
before the bank takes it through foreclosure.   
 Another example deals with interest only loans.  Problems with these types of 
loans can be especially prevalent in what can at the outset be called “hot” housing 
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markets.  A household can get an interest only loan for a house that they could not afford 
with a more conventional mortgage.  The household then makes payments only on the 
interest while the home appreciates rapidly.  When time comes for the mortgage payment 
to include principle, the household can sell their house for a profit, possibly moving to a 
bigger home and continuing this cycle all over again.  There is also the possibility that the 
household could refinance.  The problem occurs when the “hot” market cools off 
considerably.  The household may not be able to sell and are therefore stuck with a home 
that they cannot afford after the new payment phase begins.  If they can find a buyer, the 
house may sell for much less than what is remaining on the mortgage, which may lead to 
the bank rejecting the sale if they cannot recover what was invested in the property when 
it was first purchased. 
 There is also the possibility that a member of the household simply lost their job 
and now the household income can no longer cover the mortgage payment.  Numerous 
other examples and scenarios exist, but they all have one factor in common: households 
buying a home are looking to maximize their utility.  They purchase the home with the 
best attributes (most square footage, bedrooms, etc) and public services (school district 
quality, recreation, police and fire, etc) possible.  In so doing, the household typically 
spends every penny in their budget allocated to housing, which is supported by the 
economic theories discussed previously.  This creates a situation where an increase in the 
mortgage payment or a decrease in household income can lead to foreclosure and 
ultimately the loss of the home for the household.   
 The process of foreclosure can be complicated and time consuming, with many 
negative consequences for the household, bank, neighbors, neighborhood, city and 
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region.  Households are forced to uproot their family and move.  Their credit is also 
damaged.  Banks lose an investment and may become property owners, which does not 
suit them.  Neighbors lose members of their community and may see the value of their 
property decline.  The neighborhood as a whole may decline through the unraveling of its 
social fabric.  Cities lose tax dollars through lower property values and cannot provide as 
high of quality of services.  Relating this back to Tiebout (1956), households that moved 
to a community for a particular combination of city services are no longer maximizing 
utility if services change due to lower tax revenues.  The households then might consider 
moving to a different municipality that can provide the types of city services for which 
they are looking.  If foreclosures are impacting an entire housing market, as has been the 
case across the United States, city amenities will fall throughout the region, more so in 
areas with high foreclosure concentrations.  The change in services may lead more 
households to look to relocate, creating a housing market with more supply than demand.  
This leads to a drop in prices.  The process described above builds upon itself, creating a 
spiral of lower city services and revenues, an oversupplied housing market and falling 
house prices. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Foreclosure Process 
 
An outline on the process of foreclosure itself is presented here to give a more 
complete picture of the problem.  A timeline of the process can be seen in Figure 2.  By 
understanding how a house goes from being occupied and maintained by a household to a 
post-foreclosure house that may be abandoned, bank-owned or occupied by a new 
household, it will become more apparent how foreclosures impact neighborhoods.  While 
it could be argued that the foreclosure process starts when a member of the household 
loses a job or the interest rates adjust upwards, technically, the beginning of the 
foreclosure process starts when the borrower misses a payment.  Following the missed 
payment, there is a grace period.  This is usually fifteen days, but can be slightly shorter 
or longer, depending upon the lender.  During this grace period, there is no penalty for 
lateness and lenders do not take any action.  
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Figure 2. Foreclosure Timeline 
Once the grace period has passed, a late fee is assessed and the lender attempts to 
contact the borrower in an effort to find out the reason for the missed payment.  After 
thirty days, another payment is due and the amount needed to keep the mortgage current 
can rise rapidly.  Between forty-five and sixty days after the first missed payment, a 
delinquency letter will be sent to the borrower notifying them that they have violated the 
terms of the mortgage.  This letter usually gives the borrower another thirty days to pay 
the outstanding balance.  If after this time the mortgage is still not current, the lender will 
turn the loan over to its legal department and documents will be prepared to present to a 
local attorney.  Usually between sixty and ninety days after the first missed payment, 
foreclosure proceedings are initiated in court against the borrower.  This is known as the 
foreclosure filing and is the first time foreclosure information is available publicly.  The 
foreclosure must be advertised, most often in the local paper and the largest circulating 
daily in the metro area.  The legal part of the foreclosure can take as little as two months 
in some states to well over a year in other states.  Once court proceedings have begun, the 
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borrower already owes a substantial amount to the bank, including two or more monthly 
payments and the late fees and penalties.  If the borrower and lender cannot reach a 
compromise to keep the borrower in the home or otherwise pay what is owed, such as a 
short sale, the court case closes out with the bank foreclosing on the property. 
The foreclosure proceedings end when the property is auctioned publicly.  Here, 
the property can be bid on by anyone.  Speculators often come to foreclosure auctions 
looking to bid low and then sell at a higher price, making a quick turn around.  Banks 
almost always send a representative to the auction to assure that the bank recovers what 
they have invested in the property.  The bank’s representative will bid up the price to the 
amount owed and if no one else is willing to bid above that amount, the bank will end up 
with the property.  This is not ideal, as banks are in the business of money and not 
property ownership.  In many states, borrowers have a right of redemption.  This right 
allows borrowers to pay off the outstanding balance before the gavel falls at the auction 
and in some states, borrowers can do so even after the auction. 
This process of foreclosure raises several questions.  For example, what are the 
causes of foreclosure?  What happens that makes a borrower unable to make a payment?  
It is possible that the borrower recently lost a job.  Other economic factors may also come 
into play.  There are also variables surrounding the mortgage itself.  Does it have an 
adjustable rate and when did the rates adjust?  Did the rates adjust upwards and how 
much did that increase the borrower’s monthly payment?  The mortgage lending industry 
must also have a part in determining whether or not a foreclosure takes place.  Despite a 
thorough understanding of the foreclosure process, still unknown is the event that 
triggered the foreclosure process.   
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3.2 Causes of Foreclosure 
 
 
There are many reasons or causes for the rise in foreclosures, but three broad, 
general areas have been consistently linked to the foreclosure crisis.  The first is the 
mortgage lending industry, as there has been an increase in subprime lending and 
alternative mortgage products.  Subprime lending is beneficial because it opens up lines 
of credit to borrowers who could not otherwise obtain a mortgage, but it is also the victim 
of abuses that can eventually lead to foreclosures.  Apgar and Duda (2005a) note that 
foreclosures in the City of Chicago have doubled since 1996 even though the rate of 
foreclosure for prime loans has remained relatively stable.  The culprit has been the 
increasing number of subprime loans.  In a separate study of Chicago, Immergluck and 
Smith (2005) come to a similar conclusion using a multivariate approach.  Subprime 
loans lead to foreclosures at a much higher rate than do prime loans and within high 
foreclosure neighborhoods, a large share of the foreclosure activity comes from subprime 
loans.  Subprime loans are also problematic because minority and low-income 
households are much more likely to receive a subprime loan, even if their credit does not 
warrant such a loan (Immergluck, 2004; National Community Reinvestment Coalition, 
2003).  Since subprime loans are more likely to result in foreclosure, minority and low-
income households are going to be involved in foreclosures at a greater rate than other 
households.  If these households are concentrated in certain neighborhoods, as they tend 
to be in many metropolitan areas, then foreclosures are also going to be concentrated in 
those neighborhoods as well.   
 One aspect of the subprime lending industry that receives an abundance of 
attention from the media and academicians is predatory lending.  It is difficult to define 
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and quantify, but predatory lending is generally characterized by abusive loan terms or 
practices that target segments of the population based upon race/ethnicity, gender, age, 
education, or other factors not related to credit risk (Carr & Kolluri, 2001; Engel & 
McCoy, 2001).  The terms of predatory loans are not designed to address concerns about 
the risk of default, but rather to gouge and harm the borrower for the benefit of the lender 
and broker.  Despite trouble in quantifying predatory loans, the Coalition for Responsible 
Lending estimates that U.S. borrowers lose $9.1 billion every year as a result of predatory 
loans.  The $9.1 billion in loses comes from losing equity, excessive foreclosures and 
other factors (Stein, 2001).  With evidence from recent studies, the conclusion can be 
made that subprime lending, along with predatory loans, is one of the causal factors of 
the recent boom in foreclosures nationwide.        
The second factor related to the recent rise in foreclosures is the economy.  An 
economic brief released by the Center for Economic Development at Cleveland State 
University in July of 2007 found that employment growth in Northeast Ohio, one of the 
areas hardest hit by the foreclosure boom, was modest at 6.8 percent.  Employment 
growth in Ohio, a state hard hit by foreclosures, was 11.7 percent.  To put those two 
growth rates in perspective, the national employment growth rate was 23.1 percent.  From 
2005 to 2006, employment growth in the Northeast Ohio region was 0.1 percent.  To 
make matters worse, manufacturing, the largest employment sector in the region with a 
decent average wage of $50,600, lost jobs at a rate faster than the national average.  The 
other two largest sectors in terms of employment are health care and social assistance and 
retail trade.  Unfortunately, these industries have relatively low average wages at $35,300 
and $22,500 respectively (Yamoah, 2007).  In terms of foreclosure, the economy in 
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Northeast Ohio contributes to the problem through stagnant job growth; job loss in key 
sectors and lower wages in some of the high employment sectors. 
Indiana, another state hit hard by foreclosure, has had similar problems related to 
job loss and wage reductions, particularly in the manufacturing sector (National 
Association of Realtors, 2004).  That same study also notes that the foreclosure rate in 
San Francisco rose during a period of job cuts and that the foreclosure rate fell in the Los 
Angeles area while jobs were being created.  To bring even more credence to the 
argument that economic conditions exert some influence on foreclosure rates, two 
separate studies of New Orleans (Baxter & Lauria, 2000; Lauria & Baxter, 1999) identify 
loss of employment and income or economic shocks as main factors in the increase of 
foreclosure rates in the area.  Households that experience a decrease in income due to job 
loss or lowered wages are going to have a difficult time making payments on a mortgage 
that they were approved for based on a higher income.  These households may become 
delinquent on their payment, which ultimately leads to foreclosure. 
The strength of the housing market is the third factor linked causally to the recent 
rise in foreclosures.  Areas affected by dramatic changes in the housing market are in 
stark contrast to the places that have been negatively impacted by the economy.  
Metropolitan areas such as Cleveland and Detroit and states like Ohio, Michigan and 
Indiana have all experienced a rapid increase in the number of foreclosures.  These areas 
also have lost jobs and experienced stagnant wage growth.  Opposite of these places are 
the states of California, Nevada and Florida to name a few that have been prosperous.  
The economy in such places has been strong and growing and houses have sold quickly 
with house prices increasing greatly.  Households living in these states and the metro 
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areas within the states have been able to avoid foreclosures until very recently.  
Schloemer, Li, Ernst and Keest (2006) note that these households could use the increased 
equity in their homes to help pay off any delinquencies.  In an extreme case, a household 
in danger of losing their home could simply sell, as demand in these markets was 
extremely high.  The seller would have more than enough money from the sale to pay off 
their mortgage as a result of the strong growth in the housing market.  However, as the 
housing market has cooled off, more and more households in places like California and 
Florida are having trouble selling their home at a price that covers what they owe on their 
mortgage. 
The strength of the housing market and the strength of the economy are often 
positively correlated with one another.  Not only do households move to places like 
California and Florida for the weather, but those are also states that have had healthy job 
growth.  When households move to these states for the jobs, they then become residents 
and need housing.  This in turn drives up the demand for housing and therefore house 
prices increase.  The opposite is also true.  In states that have experienced job losses 
within a weak regional economy, there has also been population loss.  With fewer 
households in a region, there is less demand for housing.  House prices remain stagnant. 
Looking at the housing price indices (HPI) since the year 2000 from the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Florida and California rank two and three 
respectively in the percent change in HPI from the fourth quarter of 2000 to the fourth 
quarter of 2006.  That is, California and Florida have had two of the fastest growing 
housing markets in the country since the turn of the century.  Delaware ranked first.  
However, when examining the percent change in HPI from the fourth quarter of 2005 to 
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the fourth quarter of 2006, California and Florida rank fiftieth and thirty-seventh out of 
fifty-one (including Washington DC).  In terms of the percent of households experiencing 
foreclosures in 2007, California and Florida have six each of the top twenty-five 
metropolitan areas.  Of the thriteen remaining metropolitan areas, four are also in high 
growth, strong economic areas.  The Las Vegas area is ranked third overall and the 
Denver area is ranked ninth by percent of households.  The other metropolitan areas that 
rank in the top twenty-five are characterized by weak housing markets and struggling 
economies, which was also identified as a causal factor in the recent rise in foreclosure 
rates.  Detroit is number one with nearly five percent of its households experiencing 
foreclosure and the Cleveland metro area is sixth on the list (RealtyTrac, Inc., 2008).  
Table 1 outlines the top twenty-five metros by the percent of households in foreclosure 
along with the state house price index ranks.  The increase in subprime lending, weak 
economies resulting in limited job and wage growth, and strong housing markets cooling 
off rapidly has led to a quick rise in foreclosure rates across the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 Table I. Top 25 Metropolitan Areas by Percent of Household in Foreclosure 
 
Metro Area 
% HH in 
Foreclosure 
2007 
Foreclosure 
Rank by HH 
% 
State 
HPI 
Rank 
2000 - 
2006 
Q4 
State 
HPI 
Rank 
2005 - 
2006 
Q4 
DETROIT/LIVONIA/DEARBORN, MI  4.918 1 51 41 
STOCKTON, CA  4.866 2 3 51 
LAS VEGAS/PARADISE, NV  4.228 3 30 48 
RIVERSIDE/SAN BERNARDINO, CA  3.826 4 3 51 
SACRAMENTO, CA  3.189 5 3 51 
CLEVELAND/LORAIN/ELYRIA/MENTOR, 
OH  2.972 6 50 44 
BAKERSFIELD, CA  2.960 7 3 51 
MIAMI, FL  2.724 8 2 37 
DENVER/AURORA, CO  2.641 9 43 34 
FORT LAUDERDALE, FL  2.632 10 2 37 
ATLANTA/SANDY SPRINGS/MARIETTA, 
GA  2.531 11 40 14 
AKRON, OH  2.326 12 50 44 
MEMPHIS, TN  2.141 13 41 12 
FRESNO, CA  2.121 14 3 51 
DAYTON, OH  2.073 15 50 44 
OAKLAND, CA  2.071 16 3 51 
WARREN/FARMINGTON HILLS/TROY, MI  2.069 17 51 41 
INDIANAPOLIS, IN  2.019 18 27 29 
TOLEDO, OH  1.938 19 50 44 
ORLANDO, FL  1.932 20 2 37 
PALM BEACH, FL  1.924 21 2 37 
PHOENIX/MESA, AZ  1.915 22 36 20 
TAMPA/ST 
PETERSBURGH/CLEARWATER, FL  1.908 23 2 37 
SARASOTA/BRADENTON/VENICE, FL  1.840 24 2 37 
COLUMBUS, OH  1.832 25 50 44 
 
3.3 Policy Responses 
   
Policies to combat and prevent foreclosure are most often undertaken at the local 
level, as early on in the crisis the role of the federal government had been to simply lower 
interest rates.  Several cities had programs in place that were helping homeowners facing 
foreclosure before the situation escalated to “crisis”.  However, these programs were 
often not large enough to be effective once foreclosures rose rapidly in late 2006 and 
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2007.  In Chicago, the mayor and president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
brought city leaders together to create a program to help prevent foreclosure.  From this 
meeting, the Home Ownership Preservation Initiative (HOPI) was formed.  The goals of 
HOPI were to help 1,500 homeowners in danger of foreclosure keep their homes, reclaim 
300 foreclosed properties as neighborhood assets and document lessons learned about 
what are the best practices in homeownership and property preservation (NeighborWorks 
America, 2005).   
 In order to help 1,500 homeowners in Chicago, Neighborhood Housing Services 
(NHS) worked with local subprime lenders, focusing on loss mitigation, real estate 
owned (REO) properties and prevention in origination (NeighborWorks America, 2005).  
Getting homeowners into some type of foreclosure prevention program as quickly as 
possible minimizes losses associated with foreclosure.  NHS worked with lenders to 
acquire REOs at a discounted price and turn them into neighborhood assets.  Prevention 
in origination helps to create loans that are designed to succeed, not fail. 
Financial assistance is provided to troubled Chicago homeowners through the 
Neighborhood Ownership Recovery Mortgage Assistance Loan (NORMAL) program.  
Lenders are able to participate in this program for $100,000 a share.  The program raised 
$2.2 million by selling 22 shares to 18 lenders.  NHS identifies homeowners in need and 
works with the person or family in order to help them to qualify for conventional 
refinancing.  Then, NHS works with the lender to hopefully reduce the mortgage amount 
and refinance the loan.  A loan through the NORMAL program is then used to refinance.  
NORMAL loans can only be used to refinance predatory loans, rehabilitate property or 
intervene in a foreclosure (NeighborWorks America, 2005). 
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Through the first 18 months of HOPI in Chicago, nearly 700 foreclosures have 
been prevented.  In addition, NHS has also obtained 111 properties for reintroduction as a 
productive use.  NHS staff has found that loan programs, like NORMAL, need to be done 
simultaneously with counseling and information services in order to be most effective.  
Financing needs to be flexible and payments need to be kept low.  Any additional funding 
sources are of great importance (NeighborWorks America, 2005).   
NHS in New York runs a slightly different program than in Chicago and focuses 
mainly on education.  There is an early-delinquency intervention, a foreclosure-
prevention orientation, a predatory-lending awareness orientation, one-on-one 
counseling, and a five-week foreclosure-prevention class (NeighborWorks America, 
2005).  NHS holds forums in neighborhoods identified as at-risk in order to alert 
homeowners to these services.  Staff at NHS in New York identifies early intervention as 
the key to preventing foreclosure. 
A data driven approach could be modeled after the Philadelphia Neighborhood 
Information System.  This information system contains data on numerous attributes of 
housing in Philadelphia, including housing characteristics, presence of housing code 
violations and any tax delinquencies.  Hillier, Culhane, Smith and Tomlin (2003) use the 
information system to predict housing abandonment in Philadelphia.  A similar system 
could be used to identify properties or neighborhoods that were at risk for foreclosure and 
the city could in turn implement their prevention programs in those areas, making service 
delivery more efficient.  Important to the success of such a system would be information 
about the loans that were used to purchase homes.   
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While all of the above mentioned programs were in place prior to the most current 
foreclosure crisis, other areas of the country had little or no programming in place to 
handle issues related to foreclosure.  In Cuyahoga County in Northeast Ohio, the location 
of the major city Cleveland, officials have taken an educational approach to the 
foreclosure problem.  Mitigation strategies are necessary as Cuyahoga County has the 
highest foreclosure rate in the state and the Cleveland metro area ranks in the top ten 
nationally (RealtyTrac, Inc., 2008; Schiller, 2007).  After studying the problem over a 
summer with input from various advocates and experts, the three county commissioners 
created a program aimed at attacking the root causes of foreclosure.  The program offers 
counseling for those borrowers experiencing financial distress as well as for those who 
are considering a home loan and those with questions about their credit.  By providing 
education to those populations previously mentioned, it is hoped that borrowers and 
future borrowers can be steered in directions that will not lead to foreclosure, but 
appropriate loans and for those in distress, ways to work with lenders to keep their 
homes.   
An important part of Cuyahoga County’s program is the United Way’s First Call 
For Help Line.  Any borrower living in Cuyahoga County, who wants to remain in their 
home and who has the financial means to maintain a payment plan for their loan is 
eligible to receive counseling and advice through the Foreclosure Prevention Program.  
These borrowers are asked to call 2-1-1 and from there they are directed to the proper 
counseling services.  In addition to partnering with the United Way, there are many other 
partners in the county’s program, including lenders, foundations, counseling agencies, 
government partners and community partners.  An extensive partnering network like the 
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one in Cuyahoga County can better provide the right resources and services to those in 
need.  One final piece of the program involves changes made to the court system, which 
attempt to expedite the process of foreclosure, shortening the time between the filing of 
the foreclosure complaint and the sheriff sale.  In doing this, properties can move from 
productive to unproductive and back again much more quickly.   
In addition to the educational aspects of Cuyahoga County’s foreclosure 
programs, county officials have been working on legislation at the state level to allow the 
county to set up a land bank.  The legislation passed in the Ohio Senate near the end of 
2008 and allows the county to buy or accept abandoned and foreclosed homes (Marshall, 
2008).  Homes deemed to be beyond repair are then demolished.  This allows the county 
to clear out some of its more debilitated and blighted homes.  Homes in good condition 
are held in a trust with the hope of reintroducing them into the housing stock as soon as 
the market will allow.  Since the county has been losing population for some time, there 
is no real rush to rebuild with plenty of housing present in the county.  Ohio senators also 
made it clear in the legislation that the county was only to clear land and hold it; any 
rehabilitation will have to be done by the private sector.  The county cannot take new 
properties into the land bank after two years (Marshall, 2008).  Despite the restrictions 
and limited time frame, this will hopefully lessen the negative impacts associated with 
foreclosure to be discussed later. 
In addition to local governments creating policies to prevent foreclosures and 
combat any negative impacts, local governments have also used the legal system in 
response to rising foreclosure rates.  The City of Cleveland has recently filed a lawsuit 
against twenty-one of the largest subprime lenders in the country.  The lenders are 
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accused of knowingly putting the city into a financial crisis by flooding the housing 
market with subprime loans that people could never repay.  The suit was filed in the 
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court under the state’s public nuisance law.  The banks 
targeted in this lawsuit are not those who originally made the loans, but those who 
purchase the loans, bundle them into securities and divide them into shares to be sold on 
the stock exchange (Gomez & Ott, 2008). 
In a slightly different effort just days before Cleveland filed their lawsuit, the City 
of Baltimore filed suit against Wells Fargo.  Baltimore alleges that Wells Fargo violated 
fair-housing laws by targeting minority neighborhoods and placing households in loans 
that they could not afford.  This practice is known as reverse redlining.  The Cleveland 
suit does not mention race and twenty-one lenders were mentioned in their suit, not just 
one.  Other than that, the two suits are quite similar.  Both note the loses in property taxes 
from declining property values, the increases in police and fire costs due to increases in 
crime and arson, and the social costs of trying to keep neighborhoods afloat that are being 
devastated by foreclosure (Gomez & Ott, 2008).   
Since Baltimore and Cleveland filed suit early in 2008, others cities have also 
taken a legal approach to dealing with foreclosures in their neighborhoods.  Buffalo has 
sued thirty-seven lenders under the city’s upkeep code.  They are seeking the costs of 
maintaining and demolishing fifty-seven abandoned homes.  St. Paul has sent letters 
lenders, urging them to fix and sell the homes that they own.  The city hopes to avoid any 
legal action.  St. Paul’s twin, Minneapolis, has also filed suit.  They have won the 
appointment of a legal caretaker for some abandoned homes and are looking to purchase 
other homes that have been foreclosed on in an effort to expedite redevelopment 
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(Leinwand, 2008).  Only time will tell if these suits produce any positive results for these 
cities.   
States, like local governments, have been involved in policy making since early in 
the crisis.  There have been several different approaches to combat the problem, and 
many, if not most states, use multiple policies.  One method of fighting foreclosure at the 
state level has been some type of foreclosure moratorium or a lengthening of the 
foreclosure timeline.  In Massachusetts, there is a program operated by the Division of 
Banks that can provide borrowers a 30 to 60 day reprieve.  When the borrower receives 
the first notice of foreclosure from the lender, he or she then has to file a complaint with 
the Division of Banks.  A representative from that office then contacts the lender and tries 
to work out an extension.  Lenders are not required to accept the request of the 
moratorium.  This is a voluntary program.  If a moratorium is granted, borrowers are 
provided materials and information about foreclosure prevention in the hope that they 
will seek help and not find themselves in a similar situation in the future. 
Maryland and New York also have passed legislation to lengthen the foreclosure 
timeline.  In Maryland, the process is now a minimum of 150 days as opposed to the 
previous timeframe of 15 days.  Also, lenders must wait 90 days after default to file for 
foreclosure and there also must be a notification 45 days before the action is filed.  In 
New York, lenders must provide 90 days notice before a foreclosure action is filed.  
There also has to be information in the notice about local programs aimed at preventing 
foreclosure. 
States have also worked with legal aid offices to provide representation and other 
services to borrowers facing foreclosure.  Legal Aid in North Carolina has a Mortgage 
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Foreclosure Project.  The goals of the project are to preserve credit ratings, prevent 
foreclosure, and break the cycle of abusive lending practices. There is also a program in 
New Jersey, run by Legal Services, which specifically works with victims of predatory 
lending.  Both programs also devote some resources to borrower and community 
education.  The legislature of New Jersey is also contemplating a proposal that would 
charge subprime lenders a $2,000 fee to start a foreclosure action.  This serves to provide 
an incentive for lenders to rework loans as well as establish a foreclosure prevention trust 
fund. 
Because Ohio was one of the first states to experience a high number of 
foreclosures, its programs are some of the most comprehensive in the country and are 
often used as a model for other states.  In terms of providing legal services to borrowers, 
Ohio has created the Save the Dream program.  This program is the result of 
collaboration between the state attorney, chief justice and the president of the state’s bar 
association.  Together, they made a request to all attorneys to provide legal services to 
troubled homeowners through a state program.  Over 1,000 attorneys have volunteered to 
assist borrowers with loan restructuring and mediation.  These services are free for the 
borrower.  The eligibility cutoff is 250 percent of the area median income. 
Another groundbreaking effort by Ohio is a collaborative effort between the state 
and nine subprime lenders called the Ohio Compact to Preserve Homeownership.  This is 
a non-binding agreement between the state and the lenders.  Progress is reported to the 
Department of Commerce.  Lenders are expected to use “good faith” efforts to keep 
borrowers in their home through loan modification, early communication with at-
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risk/defaulting borrowers, and incentives for loan restructuring as opposed to foreclosure.  
This program aims at stemming the tide of subprime loans going into foreclosure.    
While late in implementing any policy related to the foreclosure boom compared 
to local entities, the federal government recently enacted a program to help households 
facing foreclosure.  The program is called Project Lifeline and is headed by Bank of 
America, Citigroup, Countrywide, J.P. Morgan, Washington Mutual and Wells Fargo.  
Together, these banks account for over fifty percent of the mortgage servicing industry.  
As designed, the program gives troubled homeowners some extra time (30 days) to work 
with their lender to reach an accord in which they can keep their home and become 
current on their mortgage payments.  Some critics believe that a thirty-day reprieve is too 
short and that the program may simply be delaying foreclosure.  Also, lenders are not 
required to change the terms of the loans.  That is, troubled borrowers may not be able to 
work out an agreement that they can manage.  There are also concerns about eligibility 
requirements.  Households who are currently in bankruptcy, who are not more than three 
months behind on their mortgage payments, and whose foreclosure date is less than thirty 
days away are not eligible.  Also ineligible are those who purchased a vacant home as an 
investment property.  
As the crisis deepened, it became apparent that a more substantive program 
needed to be enacted by the federal government.  In the second half of 2008, two bills 
were passed.  The first was the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008.  
Part of the bill focused on the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac.  The Federal Housing Finance Agency was created to oversee the 
GSEs and loan limits for the two entities were increased.  Additionally a Housing Trust 
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Fund was created for the provision of affordable housing along with a first-time 
homebuyer tax credit.  Perhaps the most intriguing part of the bill in terms of foreclosure 
prevention and recovery is the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) now 
administered by HUD.  The NSP provides grant money for states and some local 
communities to combat foreclosure.  The funds can be used to purchase foreclosed or 
abandoned homes and then rehabilitate, resell, or redevelop the properties.  Passed a few 
months after HERA was the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008.  A 
major part of this act is the Troubled Assets Relief Program, commonly referred to as 
TARP.  TARP allows the Treasury Secretary to purchase and insure “troubled assets”.  
The goal of this is to provide some stability and confidence to the lending market in order 
to unfreeze credit to borrowers.      
Despite these steps taken by local entities and state and federal government, 
foreclosures are still occurring and impacting neighborhoods throughout the country in a 
negative way.  Beyond the causes and policy responses to foreclosure, we are left to 
wonder about the impacts that foreclosures have on neighborhoods during the foreclosure 
proceedings as well as after the process has been completed.  Are homes properly 
maintained during this time?  What happens to the property if the bank obtains 
ownership?  Do foreclosures create havens for crime?  What happens to property values?  
These are all questions that need to be answered and this dissertation will address the 
most pressing questions.  The study of these impacts is vital to the mediation of problems 
caused by foreclosure.  The impacts can be classified as social, neighborhood and 
property. 
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3.4 Impacts of Foreclosure 
  
The most immediate and obvious negative impact of foreclosure happens to the 
family or household living in the foreclosed house.  When the first notice of foreclosure 
comes, the family has the stress of deciding what to do.  They might attempt to get the 
money together to avoid the foreclosure or they can start to look for another place to live.  
If they cannot accomplish that and are forced to move, they then have the stresses that 
come with finding a new place to live.  All the while, their credit score will be negatively 
impacted.  This can affect their ability to find a new place to live as well as other facets of 
their life, such as purchasing a vehicle, possibly to get to work and back, and buying a 
home in the future when their finances are once again stable.  Beyond these very personal 
impacts that foreclosures have on the household, impacts also extend into the surrounding 
neighborhood.  
 Another negative impact of increased foreclosure activity is an increase in crime.  
Immergluck and Smith (2006a) found that higher foreclosure rates contribute to higher 
levels of violent crime.  Interestingly enough, the impact on property crimes was not 
statistically significant.  Conventional thinking would assume that there would be an 
increase in property crime with the additional vacant housing units.  However, if the units 
are vacant, there may not be anyone to file a police report.  The increase in violent crime 
tells us that those neighborhoods with higher foreclosure rates also see a decrease in 
neighborhood quality.  Neighborhoods are becoming less safe, making them less 
attractive to prospective buyers than their current residence and ultimately contributing to 
the cycle of neighborhood decline. 
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 In a study of New Orleans, Lauria and Baxter (1999) concluded from their 
analysis that foreclosures aided the process of racial transition.  The effect was strongest 
in neighborhoods that didn’t have very low incomes and already had an increasing black 
population.  These are neighborhoods that were probably working class or middle class, 
with some degree of integration.  As households bettered themselves, they moved out of 
the neighborhood to an area with more expensive housing that they could now afford.  
The presence of minorities was really no cause for concern.  However, as foreclosures 
increased and residents started to see vacant houses and more houses for sale than was 
usual, they perceived this as a sign that the neighborhood was declining.  The decline was 
most likely falsely attributed to the recent increase in African American residents.  
Taking this as a cue to move, white residents would move out of the neighborhood, 
thereby quickening the process of racial transition and resegregation.   
 Foreclosures can also negatively impact property values of both the home being 
foreclosed upon and nearby properties.  Foreclosed properties sell at a discount for a 
number of reasons.  The properties may not capture area wide appreciation and sellers are 
operating under a unique set of incentives that may lead to the acceptance of a lower 
price (Penninton-Cross, 2004).  Several researchers have examined the sale of real estate 
owned properties (REO’s) and foreclosure sales to see if those properties sell for a 
discount in relation to “standard” sales.  Those studies have had a mix of results, data, 
and methods.  Shilling, Benjamin and Sirmans (1990) conducted the first of these studies.  
The authors used a hedonic model to examine 62 condominium sales from Baton Rouge, 
some of them were REO’s and some were not.  The findings concluded that REO’s sold 
at a discount of 24 percent.   
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Three other studies (Forgey, Rutherford & VanBuskirk, 1994; Hardin & 
Wolverton, 1996; Carroll, Clauretie & Neill, 1997) use hedonic models as well with some 
slight differences.  Forgey, Rutherford and VanBuskirk (1994) use a larger data set of 
single-family properties in Arlington, TX and find a similar discount of 23 percent.  
However, the authors include zip codes in the model as a number, not a dummy variable, 
which raises questions as to the accuracy of their results.  The study by Hardin and 
Wolverton (1996) uses another small sample of only 90 for-sale apartments in Phoenix, 
nine of which are foreclosure sales.  The results though, are again consistent, with the 
discount for foreclosure sales at 22 percent.  Of the four studies mentioned, the only one 
to not find a discount associated with REO sales or foreclosure sales was the study 
conducted by Carroll, Clauretie and Neill (1997).  In this study, the authors had a large 
data set from Las Vegas of single-family properties.  To correct the early mistake of 
including zip codes as numbers, zip codes are entered into this study as dummy variables. 
 In a change of methodology, Pennington-Cross (2004) chooses to use a repeat 
sales method as opposed to a hedonic model in examining the discount associated with 
REO sales or foreclosure sales.  The author takes a stratified random sample of REO 
sales from two large secondary market institutions, ending up with sales in every state 
and over 12,000 observations.  Instead of having housing characteristics to include in the 
model, the author has variables related to house price appreciation, loan characteristics, 
and time.  The findings show that REO’s sell at a substantial discount and that this 
discount increases in relation to the length of time a property is REO.  Properties that are 
REO for two months or less sell at a sixteen percent discount, but properties that are REO 
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for over a year sell at a 25 percent discount.  The Pennington-Cross (2004) article 
corroborates findings from three of the four studies using hedonic models.  
 In 2005, Apgar and Duda examine the impact of the mortgage foreclosure boom 
on municipalities and the costs experienced by a city due to a foreclosure.  Using Chicago 
as their case study city, the authors note that if no vacancy occurs in the foreclosure 
process, the municipal loss per foreclosure net of fees recovered is just $27.  However, 
when the property becomes vacant, the costs for a city rise.  The basic foreclosure 
process for a vacant property is termed “vacant and secured” by Apgar and Duda 
(2005a).  This situation results in a cost of $430 for a municipality.  If the property is 
considered vacant but unsecured, meaning that the building inspector favors conservation 
over demolition, the municipal cost jumps to $5,358.  Properties that are demolished cost 
a city $13,452 and properties that are abandoned before the foreclosure process is 
complete run the cost up to $19,227.  The largest expense incurred by a city is when an 
abandoned property is damaged by fire.  The cost here is $34,199 per property.  In cities 
with thousands of foreclosures at the various stages identified by Apgar and Duda 
(2005a), the municipal costs can be quite high. 
 Early in 2008, Community Research Partners and ReBuild Ohio released a study 
on the cost of vacant and abandoned properties in eight Ohio cities.  Using a cross-
sectional approach, the study found that there are approximately 25,000 vacant or 
abandoned properties in the eight case study cities.  Vacancies affect both small and large 
cities and cost cities roughly $15 million annually in service costs.  Tax revenues lost are 
estimated at $49 million.  Cleveland, one of the case study cities, had over 7,000 vacant 
and abandoned buildings in November of 2007.  Community Research Partners and 
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ReBuild Ohio focused on three Cleveland neighborhoods, Detroit Shoreway, Mount 
Pleasant, and Slavic Village.  Those three neighborhoods accounted for almost thirty 
percent of vacancies in Cleveland, but only fourteen percent of the cities population.  In 
Detroit Shoreway, houses nearest vacant properties have the lowest change in price or 
value.  Mount Pleasant had no real pattern as the market tended to flatten out over time.  
Slavic Village showed evidence of a pattern opposite Detroit Shoreway.  Properties 
nearest vacancies have higher changes in value or price.  This type of pattern is indicative 
of property flipping.  As a whole, the city spent $1.2 million on the demolition of 153 
structures from 2006 to 2007.  Grass cutting and trash removal costs were greater than $3 
million.  Over $300,000 in costs related to fires at vacant and abandoned properties were 
accrued.  The loss in terms of property taxes was $30.7 million for the City of Cleveland.   
 It is also a possibility that foreclosures can negatively impact the price of a nearby 
property.  The exploration of this topic is relatively young and undeveloped and as such, 
the remainder of this dissertation will focus on advancing current knowledge on the 
subject.  As a start there will be an inspection of the previous literature, which will 
identify what is known about the relationship between foreclosure and property values.  
In addition to revealing what is known, the review of the literature will also illuminate 
areas where progress can be achieved.  These areas where there are gaps in our 
knowledge, to be identified later, will then serve as the target of the analysis conducted in 
this dissertation.  
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3.5 Foreclosures’ Impact on Nearby Property Values  
 
Examining the relationship between foreclosure and nearby house prices, Shlay 
and Whitman (2006) use a hedonic model to answer three questions about abandoned 
houses and neighboring house prices, related to distance, density, and lack of abandoned 
properties.  For homes within 150 feet of an abandoned house, there is a sale discount of 
over $7,000.  When the distance is extended to 150 to 299 feet, the discount shrinks, but 
not by much, to a little less than $7,000.  Housing within 300 to 449 feet of an abandoned 
property sell for $3,500 less.  Beyond 450 feet, any effect is negligible.  In terms of 
density, one abandoned property on a block was associated with decrease in sales price of 
around $6,500.  When the density increases to five per block, the negative effect grows to 
over $10,000.  The absence of an abandoned property on a block led to a premium of 
$6,700.  This means that on average, blocks with no abandoned properties had properties 
sell for almost $7,000 more on average than blocks with abandoned properties present.  
While this article deals with abandonment and not foreclosure, abandonment is seen as 
one of the possible outcomes for a foreclosed property and this study offers insight into 
how foreclosures might negatively affect nearby property values. 
 The most recent study in terms of examining the relationship between 
foreclosures and property values was done by Immergluck and Smith (2006b).  The 
authors analyzed this phenomenon through use of a hedonic model and created a database 
with foreclosures for the years 1997 and 1998 with data on neighborhood characteristics 
and over 9,600 single-family property transactions in Chicago in 1999.  Foreclosure 
filings were used as a proxy for foreclosure, but it is important to note that not all 
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foreclosure filings lead to a foreclosure.  After controlling for property and neighborhood 
characteristics, foreclosures of conventional single-family loans had a significant impact 
on nearby property values.  For each foreclosure within an eighth of a mile of a home, 
that property decreased in value by 0.9 percent.  An impact was also found within a 
quarter of a mile.  Making an estimate based on the number of foreclosures in Chicago 
from 1997 to 1998, property values in Chicago were lowered by more than $598 million 
or $159,000 per foreclosure.  Looking at this result from a city’s point of view, 
foreclosures are costing them revenue by reducing property taxes.  School districts should 
also be interested in such a finding, as many states fund public schools largely through 
property taxes. 
3.6 Limitations in Current Research 
 
 
After reviewing this research, several deficiencies presented themselves despite 
important contributions by various researchers.  All of the deficiencies can be attributed 
to a disconnect between the methods used by the researchers and the actual process of 
foreclosure and how it may impact nearby property values.  This is not uncommon, as 
nearly all researchers must simplify the phenomenon that is of interest in order to study it 
and create a model to describe it.  Despite the need to simplify complex processes, all 
researchers should aim to have their models as closely as possible represent the subject 
under study.  Three deficiencies have been identified in areas that will be improved by 
this dissertation.   
The first deficiency is related to time.  The studies by both Shlay and Whitman 
(2006) and Immergluck and Smith (2006b) were cross-sectional, which means that only 
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one point in time was examined.  The properties that were considered abandoned or 
foreclosed (an unproductive use) were not so for a uniform period of time.  One property 
may be unproductive for eight months and another property may be unproductive for two 
years.  Previous analyses treated all properties equally in their impact on property values.  
This is probably not appropriate because, thinking about the problem theoretically, a 
property that is unproductive for two years will negatively influence property values 
more strongly than a property that is unproductive for only five months.   
When thinking about property deterioration, one of the most prominent theories 
explaining the process is the theory of filtering.  According to the theory, new properties 
enter at the top of the property chain.  These homes are the most expensive and purchased 
by households with high incomes.  As the property ages, its quality also deteriorates.  
High-income households vacate the home, moving to another new or nearly new home.  
A lower-income household then occupies the home.  This process continues gradually 
until the home is not longer fit to be occupied, even by extremely low-income 
households.  This can be seen as a largely linear process.  While filtering occurs over 
many years, property deterioration associated with foreclosure takes place over a manner 
of months, possibly extending to over a year.  However, the process should also be linear 
in nature, just as it is in housing stock filtration.  This relationship between deterioration 
and time in foreclosure has yet to be modeled. 
A way to remedy this problem would be to create a systematic way for 
determining the length of time a property is unproductive and incorporate that into the 
hedonic model.  For example, the start of unproductive use could be approximated by the 
foreclosure filing date and the end of unproductive use could be approximated by the first 
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sale of the property that is not a sheriff sale.  The above example would more closely 
represent the process of foreclosure and its impact on neighboring properties, but would 
require a rather complex data set covering a number of years.  A less intensive way to 
account for time would simply involve including a variable of change from one year to 
the next of foreclosure filings.  While this may not align as appropriately with the process 
as the first example, it is an improvement in that it would take into account time whereas 
the previous studies ignored it altogether.  There are also other ways to approximate the 
time of unproductive use and the above were just two examples. 
 The other two deficiencies deal with the spatial nature of the problem.  Previous 
research takes a straight-line distance approach in determining the number of foreclosures 
that are considered close to the property of interest.  However, urban space does not lend 
itself to straight-line distances.  An eighth of a mile up and down the street that the 
property of interest is located on may be appropriate, but measuring an eighth of a mile 
perpendicular to the street may not make sense, as much of the impact of foreclosure is 
visual.  Additionally, not all streets are straight.  Many curve or bend.  Foreclosures 
might only affect one single block.  It is possible that the most appropriate way to 
measure foreclosure proximity is to count all the foreclosures in the same census block as 
the sale property and use that as the variable of interest.  Possibly census blocks are too 
small and the number of foreclosures in the same census block group should be the 
variable entered into the hedonic model.  Even the above variations are simply that, 
variations.  They do not truly offer an improvement in measurement and in fact, introduce 
problems of their own.   
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Foreclosures may negatively impact nearby property values because city officials, 
neighbors, prospective buyers and real estate agents can see them.  As the property goes 
through the foreclosure process, it is theoretically expected that there will be neglect.  A 
homeowner is not going to take care of a home that they are likely going to lose and if 
they do not have the money to afford the mortgage and any late fees, then they also will 
not have money for maintenance.  The visual nature of the problem makes the face block 
an appropriate geography for exploring the relationship between foreclosures and 
neighboring property values.  The main problem with this part of the spatial deficiency is 
that the geographic relationships used thus far to model the phenomenon do not match the 
process that is actually taking place.   
The other aspect of the spatial deficiency is that previous research has failed to 
account for spatial dependence in both the dependent and independent variables under 
study.  Researchers analyzing other types of externalities have started to control for 
spatial relationships and research on foreclosure as a negative externality should be no 
different.  The inclusion of methods that control for spatial dependence need to be used in 
future hedonic models assessing foreclosure’s impact on house prices when appropriate.  
At the very least, researchers should be testing for troublesome spatial relationships.  This 
allows for the measurement of a neighborhood effect.  It is possible that foreclosures are 
simply concentrated in neighborhoods with low property values. 
All of the deficiencies related to the study of the relationship between foreclosures 
and property values identified in the literature review will be addressed in this 
dissertation.  Because research on the topic of foreclosure as a negative externality on 
house prices is still emerging, the basic question needs to be answered through an 
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improvement in methods and that is what is proposed here.  The question of interest is, 
“What impact do foreclosures have on nearby residential property values?”   
It is important for scholars to be able to identify the causal factors that have led to 
the large increase in foreclosures in the United States.  Current forecasts indicate that the 
problem will only worsen in the coming years.  We currently have a large number of 
foreclosures and are beginning to see some of the negative impacts that occur because of 
this problem.  The study of these impacts is vital to the mediation of problems caused by 
foreclosure.  Also, through the recognition of the conditions that have led to the 
foreclosure crisis, policies can be formed at all levels of government to help alleviate the 
problem and hopefully prevent it in the future.  This is of importance to homeowners not 
in foreclosure because they are worried about their investment depreciating in value or 
appreciating at a slower rate than it would without the presence of foreclosure.  
Municipalities and school districts are concerned over this matter because lower property 
values translate into lower tax revenues and citizens are then in turn concerned about the 
level of services in their city.  Municipalities are also worried about foreclosures because 
of the cost that they incur as explained by Apgar and Duda (2005a).  While so many 
parties are being impacted by the foreclosure crisis, the problem now becomes how to 
appropriately find an answer to the question of how foreclosures impact property values. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Improvements on Current Literature 
 
 
Shlay and Whitman (2006) and Immergluck and Smith (2006b) used a hedonic 
model in their study of the impact of foreclosures on residential property values.  The 
authors chose to use a hedonic model as it most appropriately measures price variation 
for a product with multiple attributes.  In this case, the product is housing and the 
multiple attributes can be categorized as structure, location and neighborhood.  The 
inclusion of an externality, such as nearby foreclosures, is easily integrated as a 
neighborhood attribute.  Since this dissertation focuses on a particular neighborhood 
impact, it is appropriate to once again use a hedonic model to answer that same question, 
but with improvements on the methods.  The improvements undertaken in this 
dissertation will create models that better represent the process that is occurring in cities 
throughout the United States as homeowners are becoming delinquent on mortgages and 
the subsequent foreclosure that may follow.  Cuyahoga County in Northeast Ohio and 
home to the City of Cleveland is used as a case study. 
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 The necessary improvements for this research to advance current knowledge 
about the relationship between foreclosure and property values are three fold in this 
dissertation.  The first is the inclusion of time in the model.  While it may be easiest to 
create a rate of change variable from one year to the next (2006 to 2007), that variable 
does not best represent the process under examination, despite it being an improvement 
over not including time at all.  Ideally, as previously mentioned, each foreclosure would 
have some type of temporal weight or category associated with it, as theory would 
indicate properties that have been in the foreclosure process longer will have a greater 
impact on neighboring property values.  This type of variable will require data from 
multiple sources as well as multiple years.  In Cuyahoga County, where this study is 
based, foreclosure data with geographic information is available for enough years to 
create such a database.  Also included in the database are real estate transactions (single-
family residential units) from the Cuyahoga County Auditor.  Important variables from 
the Auditor include the type of deed involved in the transaction as well as sales price and 
property characteristics.  By integrating foreclosure data with sales data, a database can 
be created to measure the length of time a property is in foreclosure.  This will allow for 
different categories of time to be incorporated in the hedonic model.  Pennington-Cross 
(2004) was able to test the impact of time on the sales price of the foreclosed property 
itself with a similar database at the national level, although the author conducted a repeat 
sales study as opposed to a hedonic one.  Additionally, that study looked at the sale of the 
foreclosed property and not at the neighborhood impact.  
The second is an alteration in how proximity is assessed.  The two previous 
studies mentioned take a straight-line distance approach.  Authors either use the distance 
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from the externality to the home as the variable of interest, or create buffers of a certain 
distance to use in operationalizing the externality variable.  This dissertation advances 
that thinking by using face blocks as the geographic areas of interest.  Instead of counting 
all the foreclosures within an eighth or quarter mile of the property, the foreclosure 
variable will be operationalized by counting all of the foreclosures within the property’s 
face block.  This method treats the foreclosure problem on a block-by-block basis, which 
is one of the most fundamental levels in which foreclosures can act as a negative 
externality, with the most basic impact occurring at the parcel level.  That variable will 
enter the hedonic model along with the variables traditionally found in a hedonic model 
for house price related to the location of the property, its structural characteristics and the 
characteristics of the neighborhood.   
The third improvement in methods will take place by accounting for spatial 
problems in the model.  For example, Armstrong and Rodriguez (2006) use the residuals 
from their regression, LaGrange multiplier tests and their robust counterparts in 
conjunction with other specifications of spatial contiguity to test for spatial 
autocorrelation.  The results of those tests led them to turn to a spatially estimated 
hedonic model.  Likewise, Brasington and Hite (2003) decided on a spatial Durbin model 
for their study of environmental quality to address problems of spatial dependence.  The 
study here will take similar precautions to test for spatial dependence, heterogeneity and 
autocorrelation and remedy any issues that arise through the use of the appropriate spatial 
statistical tools.  This step is vital.  Foreclosures within a face block may simply be 
picking up a “bad neighborhood” effect as opposed to a real impact by foreclosures.  All 
of these improvements will receive more attention in the paragraphs below. 
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4.2 Hedonic Model and Externalities 
 
 
One of the most widely used methods in modeling housing prices and the 
individual characteristics that determine the price of a home is a hedonic model.  A good 
hedonic model will include variables about the location of the house, its structural 
characteristics and aspects of the neighborhood.  It is not uncommon for researchers to 
use this basic hedonic model and then add a variable of interest to the model in order to 
see how it affects house prices.  If this variable is external to the home, it can be 
considered an externality.  There are two types of externalities.  An externality that 
positively affects house price is considered a positive externality and one that negatively 
affects house price is likewise called a negative externality.  Researchers have examined 
a myriad of externalities and their affects on house price over the years and a brief review 
of how analysts incorporate externalities into hedonic price models should serve as a 
good first step in the examination of foreclosure as a negative externality. 
Ding, Simons and Baku (2000) examine the impact of residential investments on 
nearby property values in the City of Cleveland.  The authors are interested in the impact 
of investments in both new construction and rehabilitation.  The two investment types are 
incorporated into the hedonic model in several ways.  First, the authors are concerned 
with distance.  Therefore, in the operationalization of the investment variables, there are 
three distances of interest, 150 feet, 300 feet and 500 feet.  In terms of how to measure 
the impact, two methods were used.  One included all investment dollars within the 
previously mentioned distance buffers.  This was done for new construction and 
rehabilitations, creating two variables.  The total number of new constructions and 
rehabilitations within the buffers were also included as two separate variables.  In order 
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to determine what amount of money needs to be invested to make an impact, Ding, 
Simons and Baku (2000) use several different levels of investment.  For example, one of 
the variables was the total investments of larger than $70,000 new constructions within 
150 feet, similar variables were created at other cutoffs as well.  The authors were able to 
conclude that the effect of residential investment is limited geographically, with the best 
impacts occurring within the 150 and 300 feet buffers.  New construction had a greater 
positive impact than rehabilitation and there are positive impacts to investment in low 
income and non-minority neighborhoods.  Finally, small-scale investments tended to 
have no impact on nearby property values. 
 In terms of negative externalities, Eshet, Baron, Shechter and Ayalon (2007) 
examine the impact of waste transfer stations on nearby property values.  The externality 
is operationalized through a straight-line distance calculation from the property of interest 
to the waste transfer station.  The authors concluded that significant negative impacts are 
only present for properties within 2.8 kilometers of a waste transfer station and that a 
home increases in value $5,000 per kilometer away from a station.  Another negative 
externality study looked at the relationship between hog farms and house prices (Milla, 
Thomas & Ansine, 2005).  The hog farm variable was created by taking the number of 
hogs in the nearest farm and dividing that number by the linear distance in feet from the 
property of interest to the hog farm.  The authors concluded that there was a discount of 
47 cents per hog at a distance of 0.75 miles, 52 cents at one mile and 42 cents at a 
distance of 1.25 miles. 
 The three studies mentioned above all include specific elements of the externality 
in the hedonic model.  For example, all three studies incorporate distance into the model.  
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Ding, Simons and Baku (2000) are interested in residential investments (positive 
externality) that are within 150, 300 and 500 feet.  Eshet, Baron, Shechter and Ayalon 
(2007) measure the distance from the waster transfer station (negative externality) to the 
property.  Milla, Thomas and Ansine (2005) also calculate a straight-line distance from 
homes to hog farms.  In the cases where there was more than one externality, some type 
of count or density was included.  Ding, Simons and Baku (2000) use total amount 
invested and a count of investments within the buffers of interest.  In the hog farm study, 
the authors use the number of hogs at the farm of interest in their calculation. 
 While the above examples show how researchers apply hedonic models to the 
study of externalities, Reichert (2002) takes a more detailed approach in examining all 
aspects of the regression equation when considering the appraisal of contaminated 
property.  The author identifies the most important variables that should be included in a 
cross-sectional hedonic model.  Those variables are square footage, bedrooms or 
bathrooms, and the age of property.  This dissertation’s models have those variables 
present as well as other variables of importance identified by Reichert (2002).   
 Another important aspect of every hedonic model is sample size.  Reichert (2002) 
notes that the ideal sample size should be 30 observations per coefficient and at the least 
10 observations per coefficient.  The sample size for this dissertation more than meets 
those guidelines.  Even though the sample size would allow for a large number of 
coefficients, Reichert (2002) warns against over-modeling and introducing extreme 
multicollinearity to the model.  Care was taken to assure that multicollinearity was not an 
issue for any of the models in this dissertation.  A final point to note from the Reichert 
(2002) study is the importance of functional form in model creation.  This dissertation 
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uses a semi-log model.  The dependent variable was log transformed due to the skewed 
nature of its distribution, while the continuous independent variables are left 
untransformed.  A double log model was also tested, but did not show a better fit than the 
semi-log model.   
 This dissertation will consider the externality of foreclosure as it relates to nearby 
property values.  Previous authors have studied this phenomenon through the use of 
methods similar to those mentioned in the above paragraphs (Immergluck & Smith, 
2006b; Shlay & Whitman, 2006).  However, those methods of measuring the externality 
unsatisfactorily model the process of foreclosures’ impact on neighboring properties.  
This deficiency should not eliminate this methodology that uses a straight-line buffer 
from the dissertation, but rather serve as a point of departure.  That is, one of the models 
used will have this straight-line buffer.  From there, an examination can be made between 
previous studies of other localities and Cuyahoga County and between previous methods 
and the new method that utilizes the face block.       
4.3 Hedonic Model and Spatial Statistics 
 
 
Missing from all of the studies cited thus far is the consideration that there may be 
spatial issues between the observations in their studies.  For example, the sale price of a 
house may be significantly impacted by the sale price of a nearby home.  Brasington and 
Hite (2003) take this into account in their study of the relationship between 
environmental quality and house price.  The authors use a spatial Durbin model to 
address such spatial problems.  This type of model includes a spatial lag of the dependent 
variable as well as a spatial lag of the explanatory variables.  The variable of interest was 
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the distance to the nearest hazard, which is similar to the way the previous studies 
operationalized their respective externalities.  Findings from the study confirmed other 
studies on environmental quality, indicating that there is a small but significant impact.  
Houses located in an area with better environmental quality will sell for a slightly higher 
price than homes with lower levels of environmental quality.  Armstrong and Rodriguez 
(2006) also include a spatial weights vector in their hedonic model studying the 
relationship between commuter rail proximity and house prices.  They found that homes 
in cities with commuter rail sold for on average ten percent higher than homes located in 
cities without commuter rail service.  In terms of distance, homes within one half mile of 
a commuter rail station received a ten percent premium, but location too close to a station 
resulted in a disamenity.  While the authors in these two studies were concerned with the 
distance between homes and the externality of interest just as authors in the other studies 
were, the two most recent studies discussed also took into account spatial heterogeneity 
and spatial dependence. 
In terms of a hedonic model for house prices, spatial heterogeneity refers to a 
systematic variation in housing prices and attributes across a region.  For example, one 
section of the housing market may have older, smaller homes close to the downtown.  As 
the distance to the CBD becomes greater, homes may become larger.  There may also be 
homes in an exurban area that are on large lots.  The assumptions of the regression model 
however, require that the variation is constant across the study area.  Greene (1997) and 
Bowen, Mikelbank and Prestegaard (2001) note that the assumption of spherical error 
terms can be violated if spatial heterogeneity exists because the error terms may be small 
at the low end of the housing market and large at the high end. 
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The second spatial problem that can arise is spatial dependence.  This occurs 
when there is interdependence upon the observations.  For example, the price that one 
house sells for is likely similar to that of a nearby house for reasons that are not included 
in the model.  Real estate agents routinely examine the sale prices of neighboring homes 
when determining what to list a house at or what to offer for a particular home.  Bowen, 
Mikelbank and Prestegaard (2001) explain that spatial dependence problems can occur 
when local deviations from the market mean tend to follow one another at neighboring 
locations.  This is especially prevalent when considering externalities, whether or not 
they are included in the model.  Since neighboring houses share externalities common to 
the neighborhood, spatial dependence is found in the error term; totally if the externality 
is not in the model and partially if it is included.  Such an addition to the error will again 
violate the assumptions of the regression model. 
Fortunately, thanks to advances in technology and committed researchers, 
problems associated with spatial heterogeneity and spatial dependence can be remedied.  
Problems of spatial dependence are adjusted for with the spatial lag model.  When 
studying real estate prices, like in this dissertation, the spatial lag model is theoretically 
appropriate.  The price that a home sells for is partially dependent upon what a 
neighboring home has sold for in the past.  Real estate agents often examine recent 
nearby sales when determining at what price to list a home or what amount should be 
offered to purchase a home.  The spatial lag model accounts for these occurrences.  The 
spatial error model adjusts for problems associated with spatial heterogeneity.  This 
model is better suited to deal with data issues and data error.  While the standard OLS 
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regression model can handle data that is spatially homogeneous, the spatial error model 
can account for problems that occur due to spatial heterogeneity in the data. 
This dissertation uses GeoDa to test for both of these problems and correct the 
problems that are found.  The process is relatively straightforward (Anselin, 2005).  First, 
the standard OLS regression is conducted with the LM diagnostics, LM-error and LM-
lag.  If neither of these is significant, the OLS results can be kept and interpreted.  
However, if one of the tests is significant, the appropriate spatial model should be run.  
For example, if LM-error is significant, a spatial error model is needed.  Likewise, if LM-
lag is significant, a spatial lag model is necessary.  If both LM tests are significant, then 
the robust LM diagnostics should be consulted.  Again, if the robust LM-error test is 
significant a spatial error model will be run and if the robust LM-lag test is significant, a 
spatial lag model will be used in the analysis.  Since researchers have not accounted for 
these spatial problems in studies on foreclosure and property values, this dissertation 
makes a substantial contribution to the current literature by conducting such tests and 
making the appropriate adjustments.    
4.4 Geographic Information System (GIS) Methods 
 
 
Aside from traditional statistical methods, in this dissertation regression is used 
extensively, methods utilizing geographic information systems are also employed for 
efficient consumption of spatial data.  The above section outlined how GeoDa helps in 
addressing problems of spatial heterogeneity and spatial dependence.  In addition to 
GeoDa, ArcGIS is also used to deal with the large amount of spatial data and when 
necessary, assist in creating several spatial variables. 
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In every regression equation, there are variables that take into account 
neighborhood characteristics and access characteristics.  Neighborhood characteristics 
can include race and ethnicity variables, income measures, median house value, and other 
variables that houses in a neighborhood share in common.  Race and ethnicity variables 
are included in most models as those two variables affect demand.  There are also 
variables associated with access that hedonic price models routinely include in the 
analysis.  For example, the distance a home is from the highway is a good indicator of 
access as is the distance from the central business district (CBD).  Distance from the 
CBD can be an excellent indicator of access to the job market, although, with polycentric 
cities becoming more common, this is not always the case.   
Regardless of exactly which variables a researcher uses to account for 
neighborhood and access characteristics, the easiest way to include these variables in the 
model is through GIS.  For each home in the study, neighborhood characteristics are 
joined to that home, providing a simple way to include variables such as race, poverty 
and income or education.  Slightly more complex is the inclusion of access variables, but 
fortunately, GIS can assist the researcher by quickly providing distance to the highway 
and CBD. 
Beyond the variables that are found in nearly every hedonic model dealing with 
house prices are the variables and characteristics specific to this dissertation.  In this 
dissertation, the relationship between foreclosures and house prices is estimated.  Doing 
so requires creating a model that better represents the process under study, as previous 
research has been limited by data and methods.  However, to provide a point of 
commonality between this dissertation and previous studies, GIS is used to replicate 
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those methods.  From each observation, buffers of 1/8 mile are created and the number of 
foreclosures within that buffer counted.  This will serve as one of the foreclosure 
variables included in a model to be discussed in the “Four Models Under Consideration” 
section.  Comparisons can then be made between previous studies’ methodologies and 
Cuyahoga County with the same methods and then, between the old methods and the new 
method undertaken in this dissertation with Cuyahoga County serving as a case study. 
The new method introduced here is the utilization of face blocks, used by 
Community Research Partners (2008) in their study of vacant and abandoned property, as 
opposed to the straight-line buffers of other studies.  Just as GIS was critical for other 
researchers to create buffers around their observations, so is it critical here in the creation 
of face blocks.  A face block differs from the different levels of geography created by the 
US Census Bureau.  It is the house that is used as an observation along with all of its 
counterparts on the same side of the street and those on the opposite side of the street, 
from intersection to intersection.  Imagine standing in your front yard, your face block is 
the area that includes all of the homes on your street, including those to your right and 
left as well as those on the other side of the street.  It is in this geography that the 
negative impacts of foreclosure take place and through the use of GIS, face blocks are 
created for each observation in Cuyahoga County.  An illustration of a face block can be 
seen in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Face Block Illustration 
Several different methods exist for creating face blocks or assigning face blocks, 
but this dissertation uses a spatial join method.  Points represent the sales data and 
foreclosure data and the street network is composed of line segments.  Each line segment 
has a unique identifier that can be used to identify face blocks as well.  Therefore, a 
spatial join is done between the points and the lines, which then assigns the unique 
identifier in the road file to the sales data and foreclosure data.  Now each sale or 
foreclosure has a face block assigned to it and comparisons can be made between the two 
files based upon this field.  Once that has been completed, the number of foreclosures in 
each face block is calculated for the varying time periods in Excel utilizing the COUNT 
and IF functions.  
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4.5 Four Models Under Consideration 
 
 
 This dissertation will utilize four hedonic price models in total to describe the 
process and interaction of foreclosures and residential property values.  The first model is 
a simple, base hedonic model.  It includes all of the traditional variables found in a 
hedonic model for house prices.  However, it does not encompass any externality 
variables related to foreclosure.  By examining this model, any irregularities can be 
identified and remedied.  The second model is based upon previous research.  It has an 
externality variable for foreclosures that is a straight-line buffer around each observation.  
The number of foreclosures in the buffer is counted and included in the model.  This 
model is compared to previous research to identify any differences or abnormalities that 
exist in Cuyahoga County.  The next two models are unique to this dissertation.  The 
third model has a spatial measure of foreclosure based upon the face block.  Finally, the 
fourth model is the complete model.  It includes both the temporal and spatial measures 
of foreclosure to model foreclosures impact on property values as accurately as possible.  
The inclusion of a temporal aspect to foreclosure has not been seen in any research to 
date on foreclosures as a negative externality on house prices.    
4.5.1 Base Model 
 The first model in this dissertation is a basic hedonic model for houses sold in 
Cuyahoga County in 2006 and 2007.  This model will serve two purposes.  First, it allows 
for the introduction and explanation of a large portion of the data used in the dissertation.  
Second, it provides the opportunity to examine the model in its most basic form and 
identify any irregularities that may have to be remedied before moving on to the more 
complex models that include foreclosure variables.   
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 Every hedonic model that is built to describe house prices should include 
variables that fall into one of three categories, all of which function to explain the sales 
price.  The sales price of the homes in Cuyahoga County in 2006 or 2007 serve as the 
dependent variable for all models in this dissertation.  These data are acquired through 
the Center for Housing Research and Policy at Cleveland State University’s College of 
Urban Affairs, who gets the data from the Cuyahoga County Auditor.  The three 
categories are the structural characteristics of the home, characteristics of the surrounding 
social and natural environment, and locational characteristics.  Structural characteristics 
of the home include such variables as square footage, number of bedrooms and the age of 
the home.  For this dissertation, these structural characteristics are also obtained through 
the Center for Housing Research and Policy from the Cuyahoga County Auditor.  The 
auditor has all structural characteristics for all buildings within the county and these data 
are updated every two years.  The basic model for this dissertation will use data only for 
single-family residential buildings for the years 2006 through 2007. 
 Characteristics from the social and natural environment are the second category of 
variables included in the basic hedonic model.  Within this category are variables that 
represent the racial makeup and income level of the neighborhood as well as indicators of 
neighborhood quality.  In this dissertation, social characteristics are downloaded from the 
US Census Bureau website for all of the block groups in Cuyahoga County.  The section 
on GIS methods outlines the inclusion of these variables with more detail. 
 The third category of variables that should appear in a hedonic model for house 
prices are locational characteristics.  The creation of these variables is described in detail 
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in the GIS methods section, and includes characteristics such as distance to the CBD. The 
basic model can be summarized in Equation 1 see below. 
Equation 1: Yhouse price = Bconstant + BstructureX1 + BneighborhoodX2 + BlocationalX3 + error 
 The above model is calculated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) criterion 
for a regression equation.  The dependent variable is the natural log of house sale price.  
The first B is the constant, followed by a vector of structural characteristics, a vector of 
neighborhood characteristics, a vector of locational characteristics, and an error term.  In 
addition to this method of calculation, tests are performed to determine whether or not 
spatial heterogeneity and spatial dependence are present.  
4.5.2 Previous Model 
 This model and all subsequent models will use the base model for the core of the 
calculation.  In addition to the vectors of structural, environmental and locational 
characteristics, a foreclosure variable is included in this model.  By adding this variable 
to the model, it is then possible to assess the impact that foreclosure has on the sales price 
of a home, positive or negative.  Just as previous researchers have used a straight-line 
distance buffer around each observation to assess foreclosure’s impact, so does this 
model.  Around each home sold in 2007 in Cuyahoga County, buffers of 1/8 mile are 
created.  Within those buffers, the number of foreclosures in the year 2005 and 2006 is 
counted and then that number is added to the model as a variable.  The entire OLS model 
can be seen below in Equation 2, with Bstraight-line representing the foreclosure variable 
based upon a straight-line buffer. 
Equation 2: Yhouse price = Bconstant + BstructureX1 + BneighborhoodX2 + BlocationalX3 + Bstraight-lineX4 
+ error 
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 The inclusion of this model in the dissertation allows for comparisons to be made 
between previous research and the research conducted here.  Beyond the model that has 
been found in prior research, this dissertation also tests for the problems of spatial 
dependence and spatial heterogeneity. 
4.5.3 Spatial Model 
 With the exception of the testing for and potential fixing of spatial problems, this 
model offers the first differentiation from previous research.  The first two models are 
based solely on the prior work of others, but in a different locale.  Here, the methods are 
changed to better represent the process that is under study.  Instead of a straight-line 
buffer, which does not well represent how urban space functions, a face block approach is 
taken, the details of which can be found in the GIS methods section.  The face block 
approach works well for this dissertation because of the way foreclosures work as a 
negative externality.  The negative externality occurs in part due to a prospective buyers 
vision.  They see nearby homes, usually homes on the same block, and that will affect the 
asking price and ultimately the selling price.  Homes that have been foreclosed upon or 
those in the process of foreclosure are likely to suffer from maintenance issues, as 
discussed earlier, and that negatively affects the value of the homes around it.  When 
concentrated in an area, the problem may have a significant impact on house prices.  
Equation 3 shows this model in its entirety. 
Equation 3: Yhouse price = Bconstant + BstructureX1 + BneighborhoodX2 + BlocationalX3 +  
Bface block foreclosuresX4 + error 
 The variable X4 is a count of all the foreclosures in 2005 and 2006 that can be 
found within a home’s face block.  By interpreting that variable’s coefficient, it can be 
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seen if foreclosures exert a negative externality on house prices and if so, to what extent.  
Just as with the Base Model and Previous Model, tests are done for this model to assess 
the severity of problems associated with spatial heterogeneity and spatial dependence. 
4.5.4 Spatial Temporal Model 
 The final model can be considered the complete model.  It is the best 
representation of the process being studied given the constraints of data and technology.  
The models presented thus far only assess foreclosure as a negative externality across its 
spatial dimension.  However, as discussed in the literature review, there is also a temporal 
dimension to foreclosure.  In order to address this, foreclosures of varying lengths of time 
in each face block are included in the regression equation.  As a variable, it will have 
foreclosures of a certain time category in the face block of the sold home   This variable 
is broken out into five time categories of 90-day increments.  The equation can be seen 
below as Equation 4. 
Equation 4: Yhouse price = Bconstant + BstructureX1 + BneighborhoodX2 + BlocationalX3 + Bfb_timeX4 + 
error 
 In addition to the calculation of this model at the county level, two other versions 
are examined.  One is a suburban model and the other is a model for only the City of 
Cleveland.  This enables comparisons and contrasts between city and suburb.  It is 
possible that the foreclosure crisis has had less of an impact on suburban housing markets 
because they are more robust.  It is also possible that the housing market in the City of 
Cleveland, already being depressed compared with the suburbs, is not as greatly affected 
by foreclosures.  Additionally, it is important to separate the two housing markets 
because the Cleveland market tends to have unique constraints, such as potential 
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environmental contamination, that are not found in the suburbs.  These three variations of 
the final model provide much detail and texture to the discussion on foreclosures’ impact 
on property values. 
4.6 Hypotheses 
 
4.6.1 Hypothesis One 
 
H0: Foreclosures that occur before the sale have no impact on the property’s sales price 
within the same face block. 
H1: Foreclosures that occur before the sale have a negative impact on a property’s sales 
price within the same face block. 
 
Previous researchers have examined foreclosures’ impact on property values through the 
use of a straight-line buffer.  The straight-line buffer approach does not match urban 
space nor does it model the process of foreclosure as efficiently and effectively as the 
face block method, which is utilized in this dissertation.  The use of a complex dataset 
enables only foreclosures that occur prior to the sale to be included in the model.  
 
4.6.2 Hypothesis Two 
 
H0: The time that a property is in the foreclosure process has no impact on a property’s 
 sales price within the same face block. 
H1: The longer a property is in the foreclosure process, the greater the negative impact on 
 a property’s sales price within the same face block. 
 
Previous research has not incorporated time into analyses of foreclosures’ impact on 
nearby property values.  This dissertation is able to do so by integrating data from the 
county clerk of courts and county auditor in order to effectively measure how long a 
property is in foreclosure.  That measurement is then included in the analysis, creating a 
model that accurately measures foreclosures’ impact on property values while properly 
modeling the process.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
DATA 
 
 
 This dissertation requires data from multiple sources to create the appropriate 
dataset needed for analysis.  Information is needed about foreclosures, deed transfers, 
sales, parcel information, and neighborhood details.  Some data will also need to be 
calculated in GIS.  All of the necessary data can be obtained from four data sources.  The 
first two can be considered local sources.  Information regarding foreclosures is available 
from the Cuyahoga County Clerk of Courts.  Sales data and parcel level details as well as 
deed transfer records are all recorded by the Cuyahoga County Auditor.  The data from 
both of these sources was gathered through the Center for Housing Research and Policy 
at the Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University.  
The third source is the U.S. Census Bureau and data regarding neighborhood 
characteristics will be downloaded from the Bureau’s website.  Lastly, GIS will be used 
to calculate some of the neighborhood variables. 
 Foreclosure filings are updated on the county court website every two weeks..  
This dissertation will use foreclosure data from 2005 through 2007.  Each foreclosure has 
a parcel number associated with it.  Using these data and data from the Auditor on sheriff 
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sales, a timeline is created for each foreclosure to determine how long the property has 
been in the foreclosure process.  During this time, maintenance on the property could be 
sparse, leading to the hypothesized negative externality.  In terms of the data set, each 
foreclosure has a start date, foreclosure filing, and an end date, sheriff sale.  If the sale of 
the non-foreclosed property occurs after the filing and before the sheriff sale, the 
foreclosure is counted as having a potential influence.  The difference between the filing 
of the foreclosure and the sale of the non-foreclosure is calculated to determine into 
which time category the foreclosure is placed.  This dissertation has five time categories 
of 90 days each.  
 Data from the county auditor actually serves three purposes in this dissertation.  
The first is to help identify the end of the foreclosure process through deed transfers or 
more specifically, sheriff sales.  Sheriff sales that occur after a foreclosure filing can 
serve as the end date of the foreclosure process.  By utilizing deed transfer records from 
the auditor; the foreclosure timeline can be better measured, as discussed in the previous 
paragraph.  The second and third purposes of the auditor data are related to the hedonic 
model.  This dissertation is focused on determining whether or not foreclosures affect 
property values, and if they do, what is the magnitude of that impact.  Therefore, the 
dependent variable in the hedonic model will be sales prices from all single-family 
residential units from April 2006 through December 2007.  The sales price of foreclosed 
properties is not included in the model.  County auditor data can also provide a great 
number of the independent variables used in the hedonic model.  These characteristics, 
such as square footage, number of bedrooms, and lot size, serve as the property 
characteristic variables.   
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 While the auditor data provides the dependent variable and property 
characteristics, U.S. Census Bureau data will be downloaded at the block group level for 
the year 2000 to account for most of the neighborhood characteristic variables in the 
hedonic model.  Also downloaded from the census will be a TIGER shapefile of the road 
network for Cuyahoga County.  This will be used in the creation of face blocks.  
Important neighborhood characteristics can include the racial makeup, median income, 
poverty rate, median house value, and educational attainment among others.  These 
variables are able to be included in the model by spatially joining the block group data to 
the parcel in GIS. 
 In addition to joining the census data to the parcel data, GIS will also be utilized 
to create location variables as well as the face blocks for the foreclosure variable.  One 
location variable commonly included in hedonic models on house prices is the distance a 
property is from the CBD.  This can be calculated in GIS, and often proves to be an 
important control variable.  In order to best match the process that occurs when 
foreclosures impact neighboring properties’ sales prices, foreclosures will be assigned to 
a face block in GIS.  This dissertation will use TIGER line segments as face blocks 
(Community Research Partners, 2008).  After the foreclosure is assigned a face block, 
linking the face block ID of the foreclosure with all sales that have the same face block 
ID creates the foreclosure variable.  Using the dates of foreclosure filing and date of 
sales, time categories are created that serve as a count for all foreclosures within the face 
block that fall into each respective time frame.  There are five categories of 90 days.  This 
complex web of data and sources, including county court and auditor data, census data, 
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and GIS created variables provide an excellent database from which to study the impact 
that foreclosures have on nearby property values. 
 All of these data results in the creation of two data files, one is sales data and the 
other is foreclosure data.  After cleaning the sales data, there are just over 23,000 
observations for study.  Properties with sales prices identified as extreme outliers were 
eliminated.  The foreclosure file has an equally large number of observations, 36,723.  
The two files have a primary key that links them geographically, the face block identifier 
from the spatial join.  Through the use of this field and a few other important fields, the 
foreclosure variables are created, five in all.  Each foreclosure variable is a count of the 
foreclosures within the face block of the sale for a certain time period based on 3 month 
or 90 day intervals.  The first interval is 0 to 90 days, the second 91 to 180 days and so on 
until the final foreclosure variable is for the time period of greater than 360 days or 
approximately 12 months.  The total of these five variables with serve as the foreclosure 
count for the model that only looks at space and not time while all five variables will be 
included in the spatial-temporal model.   
 With the foreclosure variables being the focus of the dissertation, it is important to 
not forget the other variables critical to a sound hedonic model.  The first set of these 
variables can be classified as the structural characteristics of each observation.  Based 
upon the data from the auditor, the style of each home can be determined.  For this 
dissertation, dummy variables are created for the following styles: bi-level, bungalow, 
cape cod, colonial, contemporary, and split-level with ranch style homes serving as the 
reference group.  There are also dummy variables that are created to differentiate between 
exterior wall materials.  The first type is asbestos shingles.  The second type is aluminum, 
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vinyl or composite siding and the last type is wood framing.  The reference group is 
homes with brick or stone finishes.  There are also dummy variables that indicate what 
type of heating source a home has, forced heat versus other, and whether or not a home 
has central air conditioning.  The final two dummy variables for structural characteristics 
are whether or not there is an attached garage and a porch.  Beyond those dummy 
variables are also some ratio scale variables such as square footage, number of bedrooms, 
baths, half baths and fireplaces, age in years and the lot frontage and depth in feet.   
 Another set of variables important to the hedonic model is neighborhood or 
locational characteristics.  One such variable is the distance to the central business district 
and the other are census variables and in this dissertation, these variables are measured at 
the block group level.  These variables include the percentage of black residents, 
Hispanic residents, residents living in poverty and the median household income. 
Another locational variable included in the model is a waterfront indicator.  This is 
another variable that became apparent after analyzing residuals. 
 Also included as neighborhood variables are the count of sheriff sales that 
occurred before the sales from 2005 to 2007 and a count of properties within the block 
group that were associated with a foreclosure filing or sheriff sale from 2001 to 2005, or 
impacted properties.  The inclusion of the impacted variable came about through careful 
examination of the regression residuals.  Both of these variables serve as a way to control 
for historic housing market trends in each neighborhood.  Neighborhoods with more 
sheriff sales and impacted properties are likely to have lower price points and it is 
important to control for theses factors so as to not attribute that effect to foreclosures’ 
effect on property values.  The sheriff sales count variable can also be seen as a way to 
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account for neighborhood liquidity.  Neighborhoods with lower numbers of sheriff sales 
can be considered more liquid.  Homes that go into foreclosure in those neighborhoods 
have a better chance of being sold prior to going to sheriff sale than foreclosures in 
neighborhoods with low liquidity.  It is important to note that sheriff sales can include tax 
foreclosures as well as bank foreclosures. 
 Finally, there are variables included in the hedonic model that are specific to the 
sale.  There are sales from multiple years in the model, so those need to be identified.  
Dummy variables are included for the years 2006 with 2007 serving as the reference.  
Also of importance in real estate is the season in which the home sold.  Therefore, 
dummies are created for winter (December, January, February), spring (March, April, 
May) and fall (September, October, November) with summer (June, July, August) as the 
reference group. 
 After outlining all of the independent variables, a note should be made about the 
dependent variable, sales price.  This variable is the price for which a specific home sold.  
In hedonic models dealing with house prices, it is not uncommon to perform a natural log 
transformation on the dependent variable.  This is needed when the distribution of sales is 
skewed.  In the case of the data for Cuyahoga County, the sales values are indeed skewed 
and a log transformation is the appropriate remedy.  The interpretation of the coefficients 
is altered from a marginal unit increase to a percentage.  For example, a coefficient of 
0.08 can be interpreted as a one unit increase in X results in an eight percent increase in 
Y, in this case, sales price.  A full list of variables can be found in Table II. 
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Table II. Variable List 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
BEDROOMS # of bedrooms 
BATHS # of bathrooms 
HALFBATH # of half baths 
FIREPL # of fireplace 
CRAWL dummy crawlspace / reference basement 
SLAB dummy slab / reference basement 
BSMFNSH dummy finished basement / reference unfinished 
BSMPART dummy partially finished basement / reference unfinished 
BUNGALOW dummy bungalow / reference ranch 
COLONIAL dummy colonial / reference ranch 
OTHERSTYLE dummy other style / reference ranch 
ASBESTOS dummy asbestos shingles / reference brick 
SIDING dummy aluminum, vinyl, composite siding / reference brick 
WOOD dummy wood siding / reference brick 
SALE06 dummy sale in 2006 / reference sale in 2007 
WINTER dummy sale in winter / reference sale in summer 
SPRING dummy sale in spring / reference sale in summer 
FALL dummy sale in fall / reference sale in summer 
GARATT dummy attached garage 
AIR dummy central air conditioning 
PORCH dummy porch 
AGE age in years 
%BLACK percent African American in the block group 
%HISPANIC percent Hispanic in the block group 
%POVERTY percent of persons living in poverty in the block group 
CITYEAST dummy home located on Cleveland's east side 
CITYWEST dummy home located on Cleveland's west side 
INNER dummy home located in the inner ring suburbs 
SQFT1000 square feet of home in 1,000s of feet 
INC1000 income in the block group in 1,000s of dollars 
CBDMILE distance to the CBD in miles 
LOT1000 square feet of the lot in 1,000s of feet 
HUDEN housing unit density in the block group 
WATER dummy for waterfront property 
IMPDEN impacted property density in the block group 
FORCTOT total number of foreclosures on the face block 
SHF_CNT total number of sheriff sales on the face block 
FORC1 foreclosures 1-90 days after filing on the face block 
FORC2 foreclosures 91-180 days after filing on the face block 
FORC3 foreclosures 181-270 days after filing on the face block 
FORC4 foreclosures 271-360 days after filing on the face block 
FORC5 foreclosures >360 days after filing on the face block 
SLCOUNT total number of foreclosures within an 1/8 of mile of home 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
6.1 Case Study Area Description 
 
 
Cuyahoga County is located in northeast Ohio and the largest city in the county is 
Cleveland.  According to the 2000 Census, the county is home to just under 1.4 million 
residents, 69 percent of whom are white, 28 percent black and slightly over 3 percent 
Hispanic.  Sixty-three percent of the housing units are owner-occupied.  The median 
income is $39,168 and 13.13 percent of the people live in poverty.  Over 15 percent of 
the residents have a bachelor’s degree. 
Serving as a reminder of the economic conditions of the Cleveland area outlined 
in the literature review, employment growth in Northeast Ohio has been modest when 
compared to Ohio (Yamoah, 2007).  Likewise, Ohio’s employment growth has been 
small when placed next to national numbers.  To make matters worse, manufacturing, the 
largest employment sector in the region has lost jobs at a rate faster than the national 
average.  This is especially troubling considering that the manufacturing sector has a 
comparatively decent wage.  The other two largest sectors in terms of employment are 
 76 
health care and social assistance and retail trade.  Unfortunately, these industries have 
relatively low average wages (Yamoah, 2007).  
In addition to having a slow growth economy largely dependent upon the 
manufacturing sector, Cuyahoga County, like much of the country, experienced a growth 
in subprime lending around 2004.  Subprime lending has been linked to foreclosure and 
potentially discriminatory lending practices based upon race and income (Apgar & Duda, 
2005b; Immergluck & Smith, 2005; National Community Reinvestment Coalition, 2003). 
Figure 4 shows the percent of loans that were subprime by loan type, including home 
purchase, home refinance and home improvement.  Subprime refinance loans peaked in 
2004 at 29 percent and home improvement loans also peaked in 2004 at 22 percent.  
Subprime home purchase loans also saw a large share in 2004 at 23 percent, but peaked 
one year later at 25 percent.  As the housing market crashed and credit became more 
difficult to obtain, subprime loans became less common. 
Figure 4. Subprime Loans by Type, Cuyahoga County, 2001-2006 
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Figure 5. Foreclosure Filings, Cuyahoga County, 2000-2007 
 
 With Cuyahoga County having both a slow growth economy and a rise in 
subprime lending, it was an area ill prepared to handle any disturbances in the economy 
and housing market and this lead to an increase in foreclosures.  Foreclosures filings in 
Cuyahoga County can be seen in Figure 5.  Filings almost tripled from 2000 to 2007, 
from 6,131 to over 15,000 filings.  This large growth in foreclosures makes Cuyahoga 
County a good study area because of the presence of foreclosures and the availability 
data. 
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6.2 Descriptive Statistics for Data 
 
 This section gives a more complete outline of the data collected for this 
dissertation.  In Table III are the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the 
analyses conducted.  The minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation are listed 
for each variable.  There are a total of 23,310 observations in the data set, which spans 
the years 2006 and 2007.  The easiest type of variable to identify from the table is the 
dummy variables.  These variables have a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1.  Many of 
the structural characteristics are dummies.  The value is 1 if the characteristic is present 
and 0 if it is absent.  The time of sale variables are also dummies.  There are also spatial 
dummies, two for the City of Cleveland (east and west) and one for the inner ring 
suburbs, leaving the outer ring suburbs as the reference group.  Also, a dummy for 
waterfront property is included. 
 Structural characteristics that are not dummy variables include bedrooms, 
bathrooms and fireplaces.  The average number of bedrooms is just over 3 and the 
average number of bathrooms is just over 1.  The average number of half-baths and 
fireplaces is around 0.40, indicating that quite a few homes in Cuyahoga County do not 
have these amenities.  Other ratio scale variables that fall into the structural characteristic 
category include age, square footage in thousands of feet and lot size in thousands of feet.  
The descriptives of the variables appear reasonable. 
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Table III. Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables 
  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
salesprice $7,744 $1,745,000 $143,980 $116,293 
FORC1 0 6 0.2 0.511 
FORC2 0 6 0.19 0.492 
FORC3 0 5 0.17 0.477 
FORC4 0 5 0.14 0.432 
FORC5 0 10 0.30 0.756 
bedroom 1 8 3.13 0.753 
baths 1 8 1.28 0.554 
halfbath 0 5 0.41 0.54 
firepl 0 7 0.42 0.581 
crawl 0 1 0.02 0.141 
slab 0 1 0.1 0.301 
bsmfnsh 0 1 0.01 0.079 
bsmpart 0 1 0.18 0.381 
bungalow 0 1 0.05 0.219 
colonial 0 1 0.4 0.491 
otherstyle 0 1 0.33 0.47 
asbestos 0 1 0.01 0.096 
siding 0 1 0.58 0.493 
wood 0 1 0.22 0.411 
sale06 0 1 0.49 0.5 
winter 0 1 0.14 0.346 
spring 0 1 0.25 0.433 
fall 0 1 0.26 0.438 
garatt 0 1 0.34 0.474 
air 0 1 0.35 0.477 
porch 0 1 0.51 0.5 
age 0 117 42.83 15.226 
%black 0 100 19.79 31.449 
%hipanic 0 55 2.81 5.577 
%poverty 0 82 8.62 9.936 
lnprice 8.954 14.372 11.613 0.777 
innerring 0 1 0.44 0.497 
cityeast 0 1 0.115 0.319 
citywest 0 1 0.138 0.345 
SHF_CNT 0 19 0.29 0.839 
sqft1000 0.412 12.684 1.578 0.693 
inc1000 6.336 200 49.69 22.786 
cbdmile 1.357 20.441 9.626 3.609 
lot1000 1.026 478.289 11.571 17.351 
huden 36.776 12956.6 2571.45 1699.039 
water 0 1 0.011 0.105 
impden 0 1357.34 93.403 145.64 
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 The neighborhood characteristics are all ratio scale.  The average percentages of 
African American, Hispanics, and persons in poverty are 19.79%, 2.81%, and 8.62%.  
The percent of African American residents had the broadest range of values amongst 
those three, spanning values from 0 all the way to 100.  Some properties are located 
within 2 miles of the central business district and others are over 20 miles away.  The 
average distance is just under 10 miles.  The density of housing units in the different 
block groups ranges from very dense, nearly 13,000 units per square mile, to very sparse, 
around 36 units per square mile. 
 The variables that are related to the foreclosure variables are the impacted density 
variable and the sheriff sale variable.  The impacted density variable ranges from 0 to 
1,357.  This indicates that there are some block groups that have no history of sheriff 
sales or foreclosure filings, while others have a somewhat substantial history.  On 
average, a block group in Cuyahoga County has 93 impacted units per square mile.  The 
sheriff sale variable provides information about properties that have gone through the 
foreclosure process and have seen sold at auction.  These properties often end up being 
owned by banks or speculators.  Many properties had zero sheriff sales on the face block, 
as the average is only .29, but other face blocks were plagued by such properties.  The 
maximum value for the sheriff sale variable is 19.  A map of sheriff sales in Cuyahoga 
County by block group for the years 2005 – 2007 can be seen in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Sheriff Sales by Block Group, Cuyahoga County 2005 - 2007  
 The foreclosure variables, which are the variables of interest for this dissertation, 
have a similar pattern as that of the sheriff sale variable, although the maximum values 
are not as great.  All minimum values are 0 and the highest maximum value is 9.  All 
mean values are 0.30 or below, indicating that a substantial number of properties do not 
have any foreclosures within the face block.  The mean values also tend to become 
smaller as the time periods move outwards towards longer time frames with the exception 
of the last time period.  This would indicate that foreclosures early in the process are 
more common that those further along in the process.  Two possible conclusions step 
from this.  It is possible that foreclosures are being dealt with in a relatively short amount 
of time and the process is not being allowed to linger.  It could also be indicative of the 
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climbing foreclosure rates in 2006 and 2007.  With many new foreclosure filings taking 
place, the early time categories should fill up the quickest.  The frequency counts of the 
foreclosure variables can be seen in Table IV.  The high counts of zero support the mean 
values from Table III.  There is also a map (Figure 7) showing the geographic distribution 
of foreclosure filings by block group in Cuyahoga County for the years 2005 through 
June of 2008 as well as a map (Figure 8) by municipality showing the foreclosure count 
variables. 
Table IV. Frequency Counts of Foreclosure Time Variables 
COUNT FORC1 FORC2 FORC3 FORC4 FORC5 
0 19,491 19,614 19,911 20,429 18,554 
1 2,892 2,848 2,602 2,232 3,053 
2 604 530 484 363 958 
3 110 115 107 90 337 
4 23 20 22 11 140 
5 8 2 4 5 47 
6 2 1 - - 22 
7 - - - - 7 
8 - - - - 5 
9 - - - - 6 
10 - - - - 1 
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Figure 7. Foreclosure Filings by Block Group, Cuyahoga County 2005 – June 2008  
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Figure 8. Foreclosure Time Period Distribution by Municipality, 2005 - 2007  
 The final variable of interest is the dependent variable of sales price for single-
family residential properties.  It is shown in the table in both the “standard” form and the 
log transformation.  While the log transformation is used in the regressions due to the 
skewed nature of the variable, it is not easily relatable to real sales prices.  Therefore, the 
actual sales price is shown as well.  The minimum sales price included in the dissertation 
is just under $8,000.  Lower prices were present in the data, but those values were 
eliminated when they were identified as extreme outliers.  The same is true of the 
maximum value, which is $1,745,000.  Higher values were present, but dropped from the 
dataset when the outlier analysis was conducted.  The average sales price of a home in 
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Cuyahoga County over the years 2006 and 2007 was $143,980.  Figures 9 and 10 show 
the geographic distribution of sales and average sales prices by block groups. 
 
Figure 9. Count of Sales by Block Group, Cuyahoga County 2006 – 2007 
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Figure 10. Average Sales Price by Block Group, Cuyahoga County 2006 – 2007 
 
6.3 Spatial Diagnostics 
 
 As noted in the literature review and methodology sections, previous studies that 
have analyzed the impact of foreclosures on property values did not test for problems of 
spatial dependence or heterogeneity.  Testing for these problems is one of the three major 
contributions of this dissertation.  This is important, for if spatial problems exist, then the 
basic OLS assumption of the Best Linear Unbiased Estimate (BLUE) condition is 
violated.  The OLS estimators become biased and inefficient (Anselin, 1988, 2005; Getis 
& Ord, 1992; LeSage, 1997).  
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 The tests for spatial dependence and heterogeneity were conducted in GeoDa.  
The first step in conducting the tests is to create a spatial weights matrix.  This establishes 
what observations will be considered neighbors.  Such a matrix can be calculated based 
on contiguity or distance.  Since the data for this dissertation is point data, a contiguity 
matrix cannot be calculated.  Therefore, a spatial weights matrix based on distance was 
calculated.   
 There is no “rule of thumb” as to the appropriate distance of a spatial weights 
matrix, so several distances were tested.  The first was very small, only 100 feet.  The 
spatial diagnostics were then calculated.  This was followed by the creation of matrices at 
distances of 250 feet, 500 feet, 750 feet, 1,000 feet, 1,500 feet, and finally a half-mile.  
All distances resulted in similar spatial diagnostics.  Since no appropriate distance 
emerged from that testing, theoretical distances were considered.  Distances of 2,000 feet 
to half of a mile are generally considered a comfortable walking distance and this is 
frequently taken into consideration in planning projects (Calthorpe, 1993).  For that 
reason, spatial weights matrices based on a distance of a half-mile were used in the 
calculation of the spatial diagnostics. 
 Overall, the results of the tests were fairly consistent across the different models, 
which can be seen in Table V.  While problems of dependence and error were found in all 
models, the values of the Robust LM error test indicated that nearly all of the models 
should be adjusted away from the traditional OLS model in favor of a spatial error model.  
The one exception was the spatial-temporal model for the City of Cleveland.  The spatial 
diagnostics for that model indicated that a spatial lag model was most appropriate.  The 
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final calculations for this dissertation include five spatial error models and one spatial lag 
model.  A discussion of the results will start below with the base model. 
Table V. Spatial Diagnostics 
  
  
Moran's 
I 
LM lag 
Robust 
LM lag 
LM 
error 
Robust 
LM error 
 Base Model 58.03 329.80 40.40 3,246.04 2,956.65 
 
Straight-
Line Model 
26.58 124.57 22.25 671.37 569.05 
 
Spatial 
Model 
54.27 304.82 42.06 2,835.50 2,572.74 
Cuyahoga 54.36 305.05 41.91 2,844.85 2,581.71 
Cleveland 11.70 195.08 88.07 111.37 4.37 
Suburbs 
Spatial 
Temporal 
Model 
61.10 213.08 26.01 3,606.94 3,419.87 
LM = LaGrange Multiplier           
all values significant at alpha = .01 except the Cleveland Robust LM error value, which is significant at 
alpha = .05 
 
 
6.4 Base Model Results 
 
 The base model serves as a starting point for the other models in this dissertation, 
whose main concern is the foreclosure variables.  The creation of a strong base model is 
important so that any traditional concerns with a hedonic model are dealt with early on, 
allowing the focus of the other models to fall solely on the foreclosure variables.  The 
base model for this dissertation was thoroughly vetted.  Tests were done for collinearity 
and the residuals of the model were examined several times.  A double log model was 
also tested but the goodness of fit measures indicated the semi-log model was more 
appropriate.  Variables were dropped and the model run without them to test the 
robustness of the other variables.  Through this process of constructing an appropriate 
hedonic model for house prices in Cuyahoga County, some variables that were including 
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in the beginning are no longer present and variables not in the model from the start were 
later included as they were identified as being important.  The regression model 
descriptive statistics and diagnostics can be found in Table VI for all models and the 
results of the final base model can be found in Table VII.  It includes all structural, 
neighborhood and locational characteristics necessary to accurately model house prices.  
The discussion of these results will be thorough, so that the examination of 
Table VI. Regression Descriptive and Diagnostic Statistics 
  
Pseudo-
R2 
Log 
likelihood 
Akaike 
info 
criterion 
Schwarz 
criterion 
# 
Obs. 
Vars. Df 
Base 
Model 0.694 -13,494 27,060 27,350 23,130 36 23,093 
Straight-
line 
Model 0.687 -7,735 15,542 15,807 11,824 36 11,788 
Spatial 
Model 0.695 -13,453 26,981 27,287 23,130 38 23,092 
Spatial 
Model 
Cuyahoga 0.695 -13,449 26,982 27,320 23,130 42 23,088 
Spatial 
Model 
Cleveland 0.390 -5,502 11,086 11,360 5,879 41 5,838 
Spatial 
Model 
Suburbs 0.698 -5,775 11,630 11,940 17,251 40 17,211 
Double 
Log Base 
Model* 0.691 -13,523 27,121 27,418 23,130 36 23,093 
*results can be found 
in appendix       
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Table VII. Base Model Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-value Probability 
CONSTANT 11.57307 0.04869 237.68 0.00 
BEDROOMS 0.01732 0.00501 3.46 0.00 
BATHS 0.05236 0.00813 6.44 0.00 
HALFBATH 0.05790 0.00702 8.25 0.00 
FIREPL 0.03498 0.00635 5.51 0.00 
CRAWL -0.13088 0.02138 -6.12 0.00 
SLAB -0.11006 0.01116 -9.86 0.00 
BSMFNSH -0.00055 0.03548 -0.02 0.99 
BSMPART 0.01407 0.00799 1.76 0.08 
BUNGALOW 0.07262 0.01491 4.87 0.00 
COLONIAL 0.02721 0.01067 2.55 0.01 
OTHERSTYLE -0.01369 0.00918 -1.49 0.14 
ASBESTOS -0.12324 0.03056 -4.03 0.00 
SIDING -0.04469 0.00824 -5.42 0.00 
WOOD -0.06360 0.00952 -6.68 0.00 
SALE06 0.09423 0.00574 16.41 0.00 
WINTER -0.05011 0.00904 -5.54 0.00 
SPRING -0.01649 0.00738 -2.23 0.03 
FALL -0.05865 0.00730 -8.03 0.00 
GARATT 0.01834 0.00921 1.99 0.05 
AIR 0.05163 0.00713 7.24 0.00 
PORCH 0.00753 0.00627 1.20 0.23 
AGE -0.00960 0.00032 -29.80 0.00 
%BLACK -0.00571 0.00034 -16.84 0.00 
%HISPANIC -0.01067 0.00161 -6.63 0.00 
%POVERTY -0.00331 0.00064 -5.16 0.00 
CITYEAST -0.21072 0.03288 -6.41 0.00 
CITYWEST -0.22175 0.03615 -6.13 0.00 
INNERRING -0.06711 0.02041 -3.29 0.00 
SQFT1000 0.24016 0.00857 28.03 0.00 
INC1000 0.00174 0.00030 5.70 0.00 
CBDMILE 0.00484 0.00280 1.73 0.08 
LOT1000 0.00188 0.00021 8.77 0.00 
HUDEN 0.00001 0.00000 3.65 0.00 
WATER 0.07276 0.02765 2.63 0.01 
IMPDEN -0.00019 0.00004 -4.96 0.00 
LAMBDA 0.73649 0.01284 57.36 0.00 
 
 the other models can focus on the results of the foreclosure variables, which are the 
focus of this dissertation. 
 The base model is a spatial error model, as indicated by the spatial diagnostics 
from the above section.  Since it is a spatial error model, it includes a term to account this 
problem, lambda.  This variable is significant, which is expected.  The constant term is 
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also significant, justifying its inclusion in the model.  The alternative would have been a 
regression through the origin.  The remaining variables fall into several categories: 
structural, neighborhood, locational and time of sale. 
 In total, there are 20 structural variables in the base model.  Of those 20, 16 are 
significantly different from zero.  Two of the insignificant variables are indicators for 
partially finished basements (BSMPART) and finished basements (BSMFNSH).  The 
insignificance of the variables would lead to the conclusion that there really is no 
different in sales price if the home’s basement is unfinished, finished or somewhere in 
between.  Also insignificant is one of the style indicators.  It is the other category 
(OTHERSTYLE), which includes bi and split-level homes and contemporary designs 
among others.  These styles of homes do not sell differently in terms of price than ranch 
style homes, which is the reference group.  The final structural variable that is 
insignificant is the porch indicator (PORCH).  Buyers do not show a preference for 
homes with or without a porch. 
 One of the strongest structural characteristics, in terms of z value, is square 
footage (SQFT1000).  Its z value is over 28.  For each increase of 1,000 feet to the square 
footage of a home, the price increases on average by 24 percent.  The other size 
dimension is lot size in thousands of feet (LOT1000).  The z value is smaller, at 8.77 and 
the coefficient is representative of a price increase that is less than two tenths of a 
percent.  Bedrooms (BEDROOMS) and bathrooms (BATHS) are also related to the size 
of a home.  Each bedroom increases a home’s value by 1.7 percent and each bathroom 
increases by the price by over 5 percent on average.  Half-baths (HALFBATH) increase 
the sales price by about 5 percent as well.  One final internal characteristic is the number 
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of fireplaces (FIREPL) in a house.  For each additional fireplace, the price increases by 
3.4 percent.   
 The exterior characteristics of the houses are summarized by the exterior wall 
variables (ASBESTOS, SIDING, WOOD).  ASBESTOS is an indicator for asbestos 
singles.  Houses with this characteristic sell for over 12 percent less than homes with a 
brick or stone exterior, which is the reference group.  Houses with vinyl or aluminum 
siding (SIDING) only sell for 4 percent less than the reference group.  Wood sided homes 
(WOOD) are valued at 6 percent less than brick or stone homes.  All exterior wall 
coefficients had the expected result.  Another exterior feature of a house is the garage 
(GARATT).  According to the base model, an attached garage adds approximately 2 
percent to the sales price of a home. 
 Briefly mentioned early was the style of the home.  While the “other” category 
was not statistically different from ranch style houses, the other two style categories were 
significantly different.  The first is homes classified as bungalows (BUNGALOW).  
These types of homes sold an average of 7 percent higher than ranch homes.  The other 
style, colonials (COLONIAL), were priced almost 3 percent higher than ranches.  Also 
mentioned early were variables related to a homes foundation.  There were no differences 
among basement types, but both homes with a slab (SLAB) and those with a crawlspace 
(CRAWL) sold for less than homes with a basement.  The discounts were 13 and 11 
percent respectively.   
 The final two structural characteristics are the age of a home (AGE) and whether 
or not it has air conditioning (AIR).  Both variables had the expected coefficient signs.  
Homes with air conditioning sell for 5 percent more than home without the amenity.  As 
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for the age of a home, each year discounts the home almost 1 percent on average.  Taking 
a look at the structural characteristics as a whole, all the variables had the hypothesized 
sign and only 4 out of 20 were insignificant.  The base model does a good job of 
describing the structural characteristics of homes in Cuyahoga County. 
 Beyond the structural characteristics, there are four time of sale variables.  One is 
a dummy for the year of the sale (SALE06).  Since the dataset includes data across two 
years, the dummy controls for differences between years.  In this case, the dummy 
indicator is for 2006.  The variable is significant and positive.  Normally, one would 
expect this variable to be negative.  However, the downturn in the housing market has led 
to lower property values and selling prices.  The regression here backs up that 
observation.  Homes in 2006 sold for 9 percent more than homes in 2007, on average.  
The other time of sale variables are for the season in which the home was sold.  Summer 
is the reference group.  Homes sold in winter (WINTER) and fall (FALL) sold for about 
5 percent less than those sold in summer.  The difference between a spring (SPRING) 
sale and a summer sale was about 1.7 percent.  All of these variables turned out as 
expected. 
 The remaining variables are neighborhood or locational in nature.  There are three 
spatial indicators, two for the City of Cleveland (CITYEAST and CITYWEST) and one 
for the inner-ring suburbs (INNERRING).  The outer-ring suburbs serve as the reference 
group.  Properties within the City of Cleveland sell for approximately 20 percent less 
than outer-ring suburban properties, regardless of which side of town.  Inner-ring 
suburban properties only sell for 6.7 percent less than their outer-ring counterparts.  
These findings are also supported by the positive coefficient CBD distance variable 
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(CBDMILE), although it is only significant at an alpha level of .10.  It should be noted 
that these spatial dummies were highly correlated with a school district variable and were 
measuring the same variation.  After testing several different variable combinations, the 
school district variable was dropped. 
 There are also a group of socioeconomic variables at the neighborhood or block 
group level.  These include the percent African American (%BLACK), percent Hispanic 
(%HISPANIC), percent of persons in poverty (%POVERTY) and the median household 
income of the block group in thousands of dollars (INC1000).  The two race variables 
and the poverty variable have negative signs as expected.  The percent African American 
variable has the highest z value at -16.84 and all three coefficients have an impact of 1 
percent or less.  The income variable has a positive sign, which is also expected.  The 
coefficient is one-tenth of one percent. 
 The last two variables in the base model describe the housing stock of the 
neighborhood.  The first is a density measure of impacted properties in the block group 
from 2001 to 2005 per square mile (IMPDEN).  An impacted property has been 
associated with a foreclosure or sheriff sale, indicating a depressed housing market.  As 
expected, the variable has a negative sign.  The coefficient is one-hundredth of a percent.  
The other variable is also a density measure (HUDEN).  It is a simple measure of housing 
units per square mile within the block group.  This is the only variable with an 
unexpected sign.  The variable’s sign is positive, when it would be expected that denser 
areas would sell for less.  The coefficient though is very small at one-thousandth of a 
percent. 
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 Overall, the base model appears to be a strong hedonic model for house prices in 
Cuyahoga County.  Nearly all the variables are significant and only one has an 
unexpected sign.  This provides a great starting point for the remaining models in the 
dissertation.  Each of the following models will start with all the variables from the base 
model and then add the foreclosure variable or variables.  In doing so, most of the 
discussion time on the remaining models can focus on the foreclosure variables.  For the 
remaining models, the base model variables will only be discussed if there is a substantial 
variation from the base model.  The next model to be outlined is the methodology of 
previous researchers.  The new foreclosure variable is a count of all foreclosure filings 
within an eighth of a mile of the sale (SLCOUNT).  This model only uses data for the 
year 2007 due to the calculation of the foreclosure variable.   
 
6.5 Previous Model Results 
 
 This model replicates the methodology utilized by previous researchers to 
examine the impact that foreclosures have on neighboring property values.  Since the 
model only has data for the year 2007, it is expected that there should be some 
differences between the coefficients of this model and that of the base model.  Results 
can be found in Table VIII.  The first notable difference is that there is no year of sale 
variable.  It was simply not necessary.  There were also a few variables that were 
significant in the base model that were not significant in the straight-line model.  The 
bedroom variable (BEDROOMS) went from being significant at an alpha of .01 to .10.  
The asbestos single indicator (ASBESTOS) is no longer significantly different from a 
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brick or stone exterior.  A home sold in the spring (SPRING) does not sell for a price 
different from a home sold in the summer.  The type of garage (GARATT) doesn’t have 
an impact on sales price and the impacted density variable (IMPDEN) is also no longer 
significant.  The variables that were insignificant in the base model are also insignificant 
in the straight-line model. 
 The variable of interest is the foreclosure variable (SLCOUNT).  For this model, 
it is a count of all the foreclosure filings (2005-2006) within an eighth of a mile of a 
home sold in the year 2007.  The variable is significant at an alpha level of .01 and the 
coefficient has the expected negative sign.  The impact is approximately 1 percent, given 
by the coefficient of -0.01.  This corresponds extremely well with the findings by 
Immergluck and Smith (2005b).  Those authors found the impact of foreclosures in Cook 
County to be 0.9 percent.  The difference between that study and this dissertation is only 
one-tenth of a percent.  Considering that the average sales price in Cuyahoga County was 
about $140,000, that is a discount of $1,400 per foreclosure within an eighth of a mile on 
average.  The similarities between this dissertation’s model and previous studies are 
promising.  The potential for comparisons going forward is excellent. 
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Table VIII. Previous Model Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-value Probability 
CONSTANT 11.55209 0.06422 179.87 0.00 
BEDROOMS 0.01261 0.00743 1.70 0.09 
BATHS 0.06104 0.01206 5.06 0.00 
HALFBATH 0.06786 0.01042 6.52 0.00 
FIREPL 0.02557 0.00932 2.74 0.01 
CRAWL -0.16780 0.03221 -5.21 0.00 
SLAB -0.11813 0.01665 -7.09 0.00 
BSMFNSH 0.06630 0.05376 1.23 0.22 
BSMPART 0.01247 0.01184 1.05 0.29 
BUNGALOW 0.07898 0.02244 3.52 0.00 
COLONIAL 0.02843 0.01583 1.80 0.07 
OTHERSTYLE -0.01568 0.01369 -1.15 0.25 
ASBESTOS -0.06984 0.04618 -1.51 0.13 
SIDING -0.05378 0.01223 -4.40 0.00 
WOOD -0.07124 0.01403 -5.08 0.00 
WINTER -0.04832 0.01231 -3.93 0.00 
SPRING -0.00719 0.01101 -0.65 0.51 
FALL -0.07505 0.01181 -6.36 0.00 
GARATT 0.00955 0.01372 0.70 0.49 
AIR 0.06949 0.01070 6.50 0.00 
PORCH 0.00062 0.00945 0.07 0.95 
AGE -0.00929 0.00048 -19.36 0.00 
%BLACK -0.00570 0.00039 -14.52 0.00 
%HISP -0.01286 0.00196 -6.56 0.00 
%POVERTY -0.00398 0.00093 -4.29 0.00 
CITYEAST -0.26100 0.04050 -6.44 0.00 
CITYWEST -0.22625 0.04077 -5.55 0.00 
INNER -0.07061 0.02386 -2.96 0.00 
SQFT1000 0.25632 0.01264 20.28 0.00 
INC1000 0.00282 0.00041 6.94 0.00 
CBDMILE 0.00234 0.00346 0.68 0.50 
LOT1000 0.00174 0.00031 5.62 0.00 
HUDEN 0.00002 0.00000 4.40 0.00 
WATER 0.11012 0.04307 2.56 0.01 
IMPDEN -0.00005 0.00006 -0.80 0.43 
SLCOUNT -0.01041 0.00135 -7.72 0.00 
LAMBDA 0.55175 0.01922 28.71 0.00 
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6.6 Spatial Model Results 
 
 The spatial model is the first change in methodology from previous studies.  In 
this model, the foreclosure variable is not created using the straight-line method.  Instead, 
the foreclosure variable is a count of all the foreclosure filings that are in the foreclosure 
process at the time of sale (FORCTOT).  This alteration has two main advantages.  First, 
a face block is a real urban space, not an arbitrary distance from a house.  The second 
advantage is that the impact of foreclosures on neighboring properties is largely thought 
to be visual and the face block provides a geography that is based on this hypothesis.  
This is discussed in detail in the literature review and methodology chapters.   
 In addition to the foreclosure variable, another new variable is also included.  
Since the face block foreclosure variable accounts for all foreclosures in process, the 
other variable measures properties that have been foreclosed and sold at sheriff sale.  
Therefore, the other new variable is a count of all sheriff sales that took place before the 
sale within the face block from 2005 to 2007 (SHF_CNT).  This distinction is not made 
in the previous studies, but it is an important separation from a policy standpoint.  Prior to 
sheriff sale, policy should focus on helping homeowners keep their homes.  After the 
sale, the focus should be on assuring the property does not sit idle under the ownership of 
a bank or speculator.  
 The spatial model uses the exact same dataset as the base model.  An examination 
of the coefficients present in both models reveals that they are very similar.  Only one 
variable, the garage indicator (GARATT), changes from significant to insignificant.  All 
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other variables that were significant stayed so with the same sign and approximately the 
same coefficient.  This indicates that the base model accurately describes housing prices.   
Table IX. Spatial Model Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-value Probability 
CONSTANT 11.57419 0.04834 239.45 0.00 
BEDROOMS 0.01727 0.00500 3.45 0.00 
BATHS 0.05230 0.00812 6.44 0.00 
HALFBATH 0.05672 0.00701 8.09 0.00 
FIREPL 0.03514 0.00634 5.54 0.00 
CRAWL -0.13057 0.02135 -6.12 0.00 
SLAB -0.11155 0.01115 -10.01 0.00 
BSMFNSH 0.00006 0.03543 0.00 0.99 
BSMPART 0.01448 0.00798 1.82 0.07 
BUNGALOW 0.07762 0.01490 5.21 0.00 
COLONIAL 0.02859 0.01065 2.68 0.01 
OTHERSTYLE -0.00927 0.00918 -1.01 0.31 
ASBESTOS -0.12186 0.03051 -3.99 0.00 
SIDING -0.03151 0.00841 -3.75 0.00 
WOOD -0.06698 0.00951 -7.04 0.00 
SALE06 0.08670 0.00586 14.79 0.00 
WINTER -0.04964 0.00903 -5.50 0.00 
SPRING -0.01773 0.00737 -2.40 0.02 
FALL -0.05669 0.00730 -7.77 0.00 
GARATT 0.01618 0.00920 1.76 0.08 
AIR 0.05012 0.00712 7.04 0.00 
PORCH 0.00813 0.00626 1.30 0.19 
AGE -0.00955 0.00032 -29.72 0.00 
%BLACK -0.00550 0.00034 -16.38 0.00 
%HISP -0.01066 0.00159 -6.70 0.00 
%POVERTY -0.00326 0.00064 -5.08 0.00 
CITYEAST -0.21892 0.03257 -6.72 0.00 
CITYWEST -0.22468 0.03560 -6.31 0.00 
INNER -0.06550 0.02016 -3.25 0.00 
SQFT1000 0.23914 0.00856 27.95 0.00 
INC1000 0.00180 0.00030 5.95 0.00 
CBDMILE 0.00457 0.00277 1.65 0.10 
LOT1000 0.00189 0.00021 8.84 0.00 
HUDEN 0.00001 0.00000 3.86 0.00 
WATER 0.06998 0.02761 2.53 0.01 
IMPDEN -0.00015 0.00004 -3.89 0.00 
FORCTOT -0.00754 0.00209 -3.61 0.00 
SHF_CNT -0.02916 0.00398 -7.33 0.00 
LAMBDA 0.72879 0.01312 55.57 0.00 
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 Both of the new variables, foreclosure and sheriff sale counts (FORCTOT and 
SHF_CNT), are significant at an alpha level of .01.  Results of the spatial model can be 
found in Table IX. 
 The foreclosure count variable’s coefficient (FORCTOT) is -0.0075, which 
correspond to a 0.75 percent decrease in sales price.  The straight-line model in this 
dissertation had a decrease of about 1 percent associated with its foreclosure variable and 
previous studies had an impact of 0.9 percent.  The impact at the face block level is 
slightly less than what was seen at a straight-line distance of an eighth of a mile.  This 
may be in part due to the exclusion of sheriff sale properties, which is a separate variable 
in the spatial model.  The coefficient for this variable is -0.029 or nearly 3 percent.  That 
would be a discount of $4,200 per sheriff sale within the face block for a $140,000 home, 
on average.  The impact per foreclosure within the face block is only $1,050 on average 
for the same priced home.  This highlights the importance of analyzing the different parts 
of the foreclosure process separately.  The final model, also called the spatial-temporal 
model, does just that.  It has five foreclosure categories of 90 days each, the last one 
encompassing properties that have been in the foreclosure process for over a year.  It also 
includes the sheriff sale count variable (SHF_CNT).  In doing this, it can be seen when 
properties in the foreclosure process begin to have a negative impact on nearby 
properties.   
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6.7 Spatial Temporal Model Results 
 
 This model includes all of the methodological improvements proposed in the 
dissertation.  Tests for spatial problems were conducted and the model utilizes the face 
block geography.  It also includes time categories for the foreclosure variables.  By 
incorporating these categories, a threshold can be found where foreclosures begin to have 
a negative effect on property values.  The categories are 90 days each and the last 
category includes all foreclosures that have been in process for over a year.  The 
hypothesis is that properties in the foreclosure process longer will have a greater negative 
impact on nearby property values.  This model is also conducted for three different levels 
of geography.  There is an equation for all of Cuyahoga County and then there are 
separate models for the City of Cleveland and the suburbs.  The last two are presented to 
examine differences between the central city and suburbs.  Results of all three regressions 
can be found in Tables X – XII. 
 Before discussing the foreclosure variables in some detail, it is again important to 
compare the other variables in the three equations to the results seen in the base model.  
The Cuyahoga County spatial-temporal model is nearly identical to the base model in 
terms of coefficient signs and significance levels.  The only slight difference of note is 
that the garage variable (GARATT) is no longer significant at the traditional alpha 
cutoffs of .01 and .05.  However, it would be significant at an alpha of .10.  The suburban 
model, which is constructed with 17,251 observations, is also similar to the base model, 
but with a few more apparent differences.  The “other” style category (OTHERSTYLE) 
is now significant with a negative sign, indicating that those styles of properties sell for 
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about 2 percent less than ranch homes.  The asbestos single indicator (ASBESTOS) is not 
significant.  This may be due to the small number of observations with that type of 
exterior wall in the suburbs.  The percent Hispanic (%HISPANIC) and percent in poverty 
(%POVERTY) are also insignificant.  Again, this may be due to the small number of 
those populations living in the suburbs.  The two other deviations from the base model 
are that the porch indicator (PORCH) is positive and significant and the housing unit 
density variable (HUDEN) is insignificant.  Overall though, the suburban spatial-
temporal model is very similar to the base model. 
 The Cleveland spatial-temporal model offers the most substantial differences 
from the base model.  Firstly, the Cleveland model is calculated using the spatial lag 
method.  All other models use the spatial error model.  Beyond that basic difference, 
many of the coefficients are dissimilar as well.  It should also be noted that the predictive 
power of the Cleveland model was not very strong.  While R squared is really only a 
pseudo R squared when dealing with spatial error or lag models, those values were close 
to the R squares of the OLS models.  For all Cuyahoga models and the one suburban 
model, the R squares approach 0.70.  For the Cleveland model, the R square is below 
0.40.  This finding supports the decision to separate the City of Cleveland observations 
from the suburban observations and is an indication as to the heterogeneous nature of the 
Cleveland housing market.  The low R square coupled with the greater number of 
insignificant coefficients indicates that the Cleveland model is not as strong as the other 
models. 
 The first major difference in coefficients is the insignificance of both the bedroom 
(BEDROOMS) and bathroom (BATHS) variables.  Only one of the exterior wall 
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indicators is significant.  When looking at the time of sale variables, the seasonal 
dummies are not significant.  The year of sale indicator (SALE06) is still significant.  The 
garage variable (GARATT), which has fluctuated significance from model to model, is 
again insignificant.  Most of the neighborhood socioeconomic variables remained 
significant, but the poverty variable (%POVERTY) did not for the Cleveland model.  The 
spatial dummy for the east side of the city (CITYEAST) was not significant, which 
showed no difference between homes sold on the east or west side.  The final variable 
that is not significant in the Cleveland model is the waterfront indicator (WATER).  
These differences between the Cleveland model and the other models in this dissertation 
are highlighted to note that there may be some drawbacks to the results obtained from the 
Cleveland model.  
 With the differences between the spatial-temporal models and the base models 
described in some detail, the focus of this section should now turn to the final set of 
foreclosure variables, which are the crux of this dissertation.  As a brief reminder, it is 
hypothesized that foreclosures further along in the process will have a greater negative 
impact on neighboring properties.  This should be seen in the regression with significant 
values for the later foreclosure categories along with higher z values.  In the Cuyahoga 
County spatial-temporal model, the first four foreclosure variables are insignificant.  
Foreclosures within the face block of a home being sold do not have a negative effect on 
the sales price if the foreclosure process is less than a year in progress.  However, 
foreclosures beyond a year of the filing (FORC5) do have a significant negative impact 
on property values.  The final foreclosure category has a z value of -3.72.  The coefficient 
is -0.017, or 1.7 percent.  This is greater than the coefficient seen in the spatial model and 
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the straight-line distance model.  It appears those coefficients were “watered down” by 
the inclusion of foreclosures that were early on in the process.  Those properties have not 
had time to deteriorate in any substantial way.  Using $140,000 as the average sales price 
again, the impact is almost $2,400 per foreclosure within the face block.  The sheriff sales 
count (SHF_CNT) is similar to the other models with a significant, negatively signed 
coefficient of almost 3 percent. 
 Moving from the Cuyahoga County model to the suburban model, some 
differences arise.  The pattern of the foreclosure variables is not clean cut.  The second 
foreclosure variable (FORC2), as a count of the properties in the foreclosure process 91 
to 180 days from the filing, is significant and positive.  The third foreclosure variable 
(FORC3) is nearly significant at an alpha level of .05.  The table is rounded to two 
decimals, but the z value of the coefficient is -1.956, which almost meets the -1.96 cutoff.  
This variable has a negative sign.  Despite those inconsistencies, the final foreclosure 
variable (FORC5) is significant with a negative sign as is the sheriff sale count 
(SHF_CNT).  The final foreclosure variable (FORC5) has a coefficient of 3.1 percent, 
which would be $4,340 per foreclosure within the face block.  The coefficient of the 
sheriff sales count (SHF_CNT) climbs from almost 3 percent to 4.4 percent. 
 Seeing as how the final foreclosure variable (FORC5) and the sheriff sales 
variable (SHF_CNT) have a greater percent impact on the sales price in the suburban 
model than in the Cuyahoga model, it would then follow that those variables would have 
lower coefficients in the Cleveland model.  Examining the foreclosure variables reveals 
that none of those variables are significant.  Within the City of Cleveland, foreclosures do 
not have any impact on the sales price of a home.  The sheriff sales count variable 
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(SHF_CNT) is still significant, but the coefficient is slightly lower than the other models, 
with a negative impact of 2.3 percent.   
 The results from the four models offer much to discuss.  There are the differences 
between the straight-line, spatial and spatial temporal models.  There are also differences 
between the Cuyahoga, suburban and Cleveland spatial-temporal model.  These 
differences and the findings in general offer important implications for policy 
formulation.  The following chapter will draw out the importance of the results and offer 
policy recommendations based upon the findings.  Prior to this discussion, the next 
section will cover three alternative models that were used to assess the validity of the 
previous models as well as offer some texture and depth to the foreclosure variables. 
 
6.8 Alternative Models 
 
 The first alternative model has been mentioned previously, the double log model.  
This model can be found in Table XIII in the appendix.  The double log model was 
calculated for the base model to compare with the base model presented earlier, which 
only took the log of the dependent variable, sales price.  This alternative was important to 
test for a different functional form.  Looking at the regression diagnostics in Table VI, no 
advantage is apparent between the double log model and the semi-log model.  Therefore, 
the semi-log model was used as the main model in the dissertation.  That type of model 
had a slight R square advantage and was more prevalent in the literature. 
 The final two alternative models were conducted for the suburban observations to 
provide more depth and information about the relationship between foreclosures and 
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properties values in the suburbs.  Since the Cleveland model did not show an impact at 
the parcel level, these two alternatives were not calculated for those observations.  The 
first of these two models was a pseudo-Tobit model.  In order to still calculate the spatial 
error model, all observations that had zero foreclosures in the face block were excluded.  
This was done to see if there were actually two different models present in Cuyahoga 
County, one for homes without foreclosures and another for homes with foreclosures in 
the face block.  The results can be seen in Table XV in the appendix, but there are no 
apparent differences between this model and the models already outlined in this chapter. 
 The final model provides more detail to the relationship between foreclosures, 
time, and property values.  The spatial-temporal models already presented treat the 
relationship between foreclosures and property values as linear.  As an example, the 
suburban model’s fifth foreclosure variable has a coefficient of -3.1 percent, which means 
that each additional foreclosure within the face block has a negative impact of 3.1 
percent.  However, this relationship may not be linear.  There may be a critical level of 
foreclosures where the impact increases greatly.  In order to test for this, the foreclosure 
variables were divided up into dummy variables.  Each time period had three different 
dummies with the exception of the final time period, which had four dummy variables.  
The dummies are represented as Dxy, where x is the time period and y is the number of 
foreclosures within the face block.  D11 is a dummy variable for the first time period (1-
90 days), with a one if there is one foreclosure in the face block and zero otherwise.  The 
final dummy variable in each time period includes foreclosure counts of three and 
greater, except the fifth set of dummies, where it is a count of four foreclosures and 
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greater as the last dummy variable.  For each set of dummies, zero foreclosures within the 
face block is the reference group. 
 The results, which can be seen in Table XVI in the appendix, are intriguing and 
offer two main points of discussion.  The first is that the inconsistencies seen in the 
suburban spatial-temporal model remain.  The first time period dummies are all 
insignificant, but time periods two through four are a hodgepodge.  The most interesting 
results from the model are the dummy variables for the fifth time period.  The 
coefficients are all negative, as expected.  For one foreclosure, the negative impact is 
about three percent.  Two foreclosures within the face block have a negative impact of 
about six percent.  The three-foreclosure dummy has a coefficient of about -12 percent.  
This somewhat linear increase stops at the final dummy variable.  Its negative impact is 
only slightly more than 12 percent, indicating that the critical number of foreclosures on a 
face block is three.  These findings also lend support to the first models presented that 
assume a linear relationship between the number of foreclosures and the impact on 
property values.  The relationship shown in the dummy variable model is generally linear 
until the final category.  The next chapter will discuss the results and the policy 
implications that can be taken from them. 
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Table X. Spatial Temporal Model Regression Results, Cuyahoga County 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-value Probability 
CONSTANT 11.5750 0.0483 239.46 0.00 
BEDROOMS 0.0173 0.0050 3.47 0.00 
BATHS 0.0522 0.0081 6.43 0.00 
HALFBATH 0.0565 0.0070 8.05 0.00 
FIREPL 0.0351 0.0063 5.54 0.00 
CRAWL -0.1310 0.0213 -6.14 0.00 
SLAB -0.1112 0.0111 -9.97 0.00 
BSMFNSH 0.0010 0.0354 0.03 0.98 
BSMPART 0.0148 0.0080 1.85 0.06 
BUNGALOW 0.0776 0.0149 5.21 0.00 
COLONIAL 0.0287 0.0107 2.69 0.01 
OTHERSTYLE -0.0093 0.0092 -1.01 0.31 
ASBESTOS -0.1212 0.0305 -3.97 0.00 
SIDING -0.0318 0.0084 -3.78 0.00 
WOOD -0.0670 0.0095 -7.04 0.00 
SALE06 0.0845 0.0060 14.16 0.00 
WINTER -0.0498 0.0090 -5.50 0.00 
SPRING -0.0182 0.0074 -2.46 0.01 
FALL -0.0562 0.0073 -7.69 0.00 
GARATT 0.0163 0.0092 1.77 0.08 
AIR 0.0500 0.0071 7.02 0.00 
PORCH 0.0082 0.0063 1.30 0.19 
AGE -0.0096 0.0003 -29.75 0.00 
%BLACK -0.0055 0.0003 -16.37 0.00 
%HISP -0.0107 0.0016 -6.69 0.00 
%POVERTY -0.0033 0.0006 -5.12 0.00 
CITYEAST -0.2189 0.0326 -6.72 0.00 
CITYWEST -0.2242 0.0356 -6.30 0.00 
INNER -0.0655 0.0202 -3.25 0.00 
SQFT1000 0.2393 0.0086 27.97 0.00 
INC1000 0.0018 0.0003 5.96 0.00 
CBDMILE 0.0046 0.0028 1.65 0.10 
LOT1000 0.0019 0.0002 8.85 0.00 
HUDEN 0.0000 0.0000 3.86 0.00 
WATER 0.0703 0.0276 2.55 0.01 
IMPDEN -0.0002 0.0000 -3.90 0.00 
FORC1 -0.0081 0.0061 -1.34 0.18 
FORC2 0.0040 0.0063 0.64 0.52 
FORC3 -0.0073 0.0065 -1.12 0.26 
FORC4 -0.0005 0.0072 -0.07 0.94 
FORC5 -0.0166 0.0045 -3.72 0.00 
SHF_CNT -0.0289 0.0040 -7.26 0.00 
LAMBDA 0.7289 0.0131 55.59 0.00 
 
 
 109 
Table XI. Spatial Temporal Model Regression Results, City of Cleveland 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-value Probability 
W_LNPRICE 0.4240 0.0366 11.57 0.00 
CONSTANT 6.3867 0.4157 15.36 0.00 
BEDROOMS 0.0109 0.0131 0.83 0.41 
BATHS 0.0317 0.0300 1.06 0.29 
HALFBATH 0.0695 0.0260 2.68 0.01 
FIREPL 0.0602 0.0233 2.58 0.01 
CRAWL -0.1660 0.0454 -3.66 0.00 
SLAB -0.2031 0.0400 -5.08 0.00 
BSMFNSH 0.0205 0.1119 0.18 0.85 
BSMPART 0.0361 0.0298 1.21 0.23 
BUNGALOW 0.1793 0.0415 4.33 0.00 
COLONIAL 0.0843 0.0340 2.48 0.01 
OTHERSTYLE 0.0501 0.0319 1.57 0.12 
ASBESTOS -0.1093 0.0583 -1.88 0.06 
SIDING -0.0267 0.0286 -0.93 0.35 
WOOD -0.0854 0.0315 -2.71 0.01 
SALE06 0.1704 0.0175 9.73 0.00 
WINTER -0.0014 0.0250 -0.05 0.96 
SPRING -0.0147 0.0218 -0.68 0.50 
FALL -0.0355 0.0213 -1.67 0.09 
GARATT 0.0430 0.0438 0.98 0.33 
AIR 0.1469 0.0283 5.20 0.00 
PORCH 0.0131 0.0196 0.67 0.50 
AGE -0.0138 0.0008 -17.75 0.00 
%BLACK -0.0020 0.0004 -4.72 0.00 
%HISP -0.0048 0.0014 -3.48 0.00 
%POVERTY -0.0013 0.0012 -1.10 0.27 
CITYEAST -0.0453 0.0365 -1.24 0.21 
SQFT1000 0.2684 0.0344 7.80 0.00 
INC1000 0.0046 0.0016 2.89 0.00 
CBDMILE 0.0087 0.0061 1.43 0.15 
LOT1000 0.0100 0.0028 3.53 0.00 
HUDEN 0.0000 0.0000 3.09 0.00 
WATER -0.0418 0.1564 -0.27 0.79 
IMPDEN -0.0002 0.0001 -2.79 0.01 
FORC1 -0.0088 0.0130 -0.68 0.50 
FORC2 -0.0162 0.0135 -1.20 0.23 
FORC3 -0.0042 0.0137 -0.31 0.76 
FORC4 0.0022 0.0149 0.15 0.88 
FORC5 0.0071 0.0091 0.78 0.44 
SHF_CNT -0.0235 0.0081 -2.90 0.00 
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Table XII. Spatial Temporal Model Regression Results, Suburban Cuyahoga County 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-value Probability 
CONSTANT 11.5362 0.0442 261.18 0.00 
BEDROOMS 0.0187 0.0047 3.97 0.00 
BATHS 0.0600 0.0069 8.66 0.00 
HALFBATH 0.0528 0.0060 8.85 0.00 
FIREPL 0.0282 0.0054 5.25 0.00 
CRAWL -0.0911 0.0223 -4.09 0.00 
SLAB -0.0934 0.0095 -9.82 0.00 
BSMFNSH -0.0057 0.0310 -0.18 0.85 
BSMPART 0.0119 0.0067 1.77 0.08 
BUNGALOW 0.0561 0.0139 4.03 0.00 
COLONIAL 0.0209 0.0095 2.20 0.03 
OTHERSTYLE -0.0194 0.0079 -2.45 0.01 
ASBESTOS -0.0611 0.0410 -1.49 0.14 
SIDING -0.0254 0.0073 -3.48 0.00 
WOOD -0.0525 0.0083 -6.30 0.00 
SALE06 0.0573 0.0053 10.71 0.00 
WINTER -0.0666 0.0083 -8.04 0.00 
SPRING -0.0176 0.0066 -2.66 0.01 
FALL -0.0651 0.0066 -9.92 0.00 
GARATT 0.0241 0.0076 3.17 0.00 
AIR 0.0406 0.0060 6.81 0.00 
PORCH 0.0121 0.0055 2.21 0.03 
AGE -0.0065 0.0003 -20.68 0.00 
%BLACK -0.0053 0.0004 -15.17 0.00 
%HISP -0.0055 0.0044 -1.25 0.21 
%POVERTY -0.0015 0.0008 -1.81 0.07 
INNER -0.0637 0.0168 -3.80 0.00 
SQFT1000 0.2485 0.0073 34.25 0.00 
INC1000 0.0015 0.0003 5.98 0.00 
CBDMILE 0.0008 0.0025 0.32 0.75 
LOT1000 0.0015 0.0002 9.02 0.00 
HUDEN 0.0000 0.0000 0.22 0.82 
WATER 0.0717 0.0224 3.20 0.00 
IMPDEN -0.0001 0.0001 -2.00 0.05 
FORC1 -0.0037 0.0065 -0.58 0.56 
FORC2 0.0175 0.0065 2.68 0.01 
FORC3 -0.0136 0.0070 -1.96 0.05 
FORC4 -0.0060 0.0078 -0.77 0.44 
FORC5 -0.0312 0.0050 -6.28 0.00 
SHF_CNT -0.0440 0.0045 -9.88 0.00 
LAMBDA 0.7517 0.0131 57.47 0.00 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
  
 This dissertation began with a brief introduction to US homeownership policy and 
how the many pieces in place to promote homeownership created the environment for a 
housing market crash.  The literature review then outlined the foreclosure process and 
provided some more detail to the factors behind the current foreclosure problem.  With a 
substantial growth in foreclosures in recent years, there are various impacts related to the 
problem.  A few of these are discussed in the literature review, with a bulk of the 
dialogue focused on the impact that foreclosures have on nearby property values.  The 
end of the literature review and the beginning of the methods section identify deficiencies 
in existing studies.  Then, remedies for those problems are offered in detail.  After 
gathering the data, the models necessary to appropriately describe foreclosures’ impact 
on neighboring properties were conducted and the results were presented in the previous 
chapter.  This chapter takes the opportunity to discuss those results at length.  There are 
two main parts to the results.  The first is related to the similarities and differences 
between the various models.  The second part focuses on the findings of the final model, 
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with the spatial variations.  This last part also serves as a chance to discuss policy 
implications based upon the findings of this dissertation. 
 Before looking to future research opportunities and policy implications, it is 
important to take a critical look at some of the limitations of this dissertation.  The first 
limitation is the face block itself.  It does a very good job modeling the process that was 
under study, but there are a few shortcomings.  The foreclosure variables as measured in 
this dissertation do not account for properties in adjacent face blocks.  It is possible that 
foreclosures behind the property for sale or foreclosures in face blocks to the left or right 
of the property for sale have an impact on the sales price.  It is also possible that the 
density of each individual face block plays a role in the impact.  This can be explored 
further in a future study.  Another limitation is related to spatial dependence and spatial 
heterogeneity.  While all of the models controlled for one of these spatial problems, the 
spatial diagnostics indicated that both were problematic.  The most problematic spatial 
feature of the data was controlled.  A final limitation is the use of Cuyahoga County as 
the case study area.  It has been well documented that Cuyahoga County was impacted 
early and heavily by the foreclosure crisis.  Therefore findings of this dissertation would 
be best generalized to similar areas.  Places that did not experience a similar increase in 
the volume of foreclosure may have a different dynamic occurring.  It should be noted 
that these limitations are not to be considered all encompassing. 
 It would be foolish to think that this dissertation answered all questions about the 
impact of foreclosures on property values.  Two future areas of research on the topic 
appear ready for discovery.  The first is corner properties that are in foreclosure.  This 
dissertation moved away from an arbitrary straight-line distance to a real urban space of 
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the face block.  However, corner properties offer a unique challenge.  They potentially 
impact multiple face blocks and future research could focus specifically on these 
properties.  Which face block do they impact?  Is it more than one?  Is the impact of a 
corner property greater than that of a property in a different location?  These are some of 
the questions that need answered about corner properties.  The second area for future 
study is post-auction properties.  This dissertation focused on the pre-auction side of 
foreclosure as this would lead to policy recommendations based on keeping people in 
their homes.  The post-auction side of the problem is also important and needs to be 
explored in the future in more detail.  One final area to consider in the future relates to 
how foreclosures impact neighborhood housing market liquidity, which could in turn 
have an impact on property values.  This type of study would employ a liquidity measure 
as the dependent variable with foreclosures and other controls as independent variables.  
Given these limitations and future directions, this dissertation advances the current 
thinking on foreclosures’ impact on property values in important ways. 
 Differences between the models show the progression from the old methodology 
to the new methodology offered in this dissertation.  This section can be somewhat brief 
as the differences are relatively straightforward.  Utilizing the methodology of previous 
researchers for Cuyahoga County, the negative impact of foreclosures within an eighth of 
a mile of a home was found to be just above 1 percent.  This corresponded very well with 
previous findings.  When moving from the straight-line distance count at an eighth of a 
mile to the face block count, the foreclosure impact dropped slightly to 0.75 percent.  For 
this model, properties were separated at the point of sheriff sale.  Properties considered 
foreclosures are somewhere in the process between the filing and the sheriff sale.  The 
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sheriff sales count is a count of all properties that have already been sold at auction.  This 
variable had an impact of 2.9 percent.  The previous model could be counting these 
properties in with the foreclosure properties.  There is no way to tell based on that 
methodology.  Therefore, this step in the progression of dissertation results highlights the 
importance of differentiating between “pre-foreclosures”, filing to auction, and “post-
foreclosures” or properties already sold at auction.  Sheriff sale properties have a larger 
negative impact than properties still in the foreclosure process at the time of the sale. 
 This presents the first of three places to interject with policy implications.  
Previous studies identified that foreclosures had a negative effect on nearby property 
values.  However, it was not certain what part of the process was most influential.  The 
spatial model offers minimal differentiation in the foreclosure process, showing that 
properties sold at auction have a greater negative impact than properties still in the 
process of foreclosure.  In terms of policy, the results from the spatial model indicate that 
it would be better to keep homes in the foreclosure process rather than letting them go to 
auction where the highest bid may be placed by the bank or a speculator.  As noted in the 
literature review section, there are several areas of the country that extended the length of 
the foreclosure process as part of their policy interventions against foreclosure.  The 
findings from the spatial model support that type of policy.   
 There is also support for landbanking based upon the results from this model.  
With properties sold at sheriff sale having a greater negative impact than properties still 
in the foreclosure process that would indicate that those who are purchasing homes at 
auction are not investing very much money.  The purchase appears to be the only actual 
investment.  If the property is landbanked, it can then be held until an owner with the 
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intent of improving the property is able to purchase it.  This is definitely an area for 
future study as Cuyahoga County is prepared to begin their landbanking program.  A 
final policy implication from this model is related to the real estate process of finding 
comparables (“comps”) in order to determine the price of a home that is for sale.  In the 
current housing market with foreclosures and sheriff sale properties, this model shows 
that the “comps” process could be skewed by including said properties.  Those properties 
should either not be included or adjusted for accordingly. 
 The final model, the spatial-temporal model, offers even more detail in regards to 
the foreclosure process.  Not only is there the difference between before and after 
auction, but also time categories are created to determine how long the foreclosure 
process has taken when the nearby home was sold.  In doing so, it can be seen when the 
foreclosure begins to have a negative impact.  Previous studies simply identify 
foreclosures as a negative with no measurement of time.  Five categories of 90 days each, 
the final category including all foreclosures beyond a year of the filing, reveal that 
foreclosures do not have a negative impact on property values until a year after the 
foreclosure filing.  The coefficient for this variable was 1.7 percent.  Comparing that with 
the results from the spatial model and it appears that properties early on in the process 
were “watering down” the foreclosure variable in that model.  The coefficient was only 
0.75 percent. 
 This provides the second opportunity for a policy interjection.  While the division 
between pre and post auction is still present, the results of the spatial-temporal model 
show that the impact of foreclosures on nearby property values does not begin until a 
year after the foreclosure filing.  From a policy standpoint, this adds another layer to the 
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findings of the spatial model.  That model led to the conclusion that the foreclosure 
process should be extended in order to avoid the property’s sale at auction.  However, 
when examining the spatial-temporal model, the conclusion is slightly different.  Not 
only should there be an attempt to keep properties from going to auction, but the goal of a 
policy intervention should focus around providing a remedy within one year of the 
foreclosure filing.  Therefore, extending the foreclosure process may not be the best 
policy.  If the foreclosure process is to be lengthened, it needs to be coupled with some 
type of intervention to quickly address the foreclosure problem.  One possible policy 
could be a mediation between borrower and lender to reach new loan terms that make the 
monthly payment more affordable for the borrower.  The spatial-temporal model makes it 
apparent that foreclosures can simply not be allowed to linger in the process for over a 
year. 
 The spatial-temporal model also offers an opportunity to examine how the 
foreclosure process is impacting homes in different areas of a metropolitan region.  The 
discussion thus far has focused on Cuyahoga County.  All models in this dissertation 
were conducted for the county.  The final model, which included all methodological 
improvements, was also conducted for the City of Cleveland and for the suburbs of 
Cuyahoga County.  While the countywide model did not show an impact until a year after 
the foreclosure filing, the two spatial differentiations presented different insights.  In the 
City of Cleveland, foreclosures did not have a negative impact on the sales price of a 
home.  This was true for all time categories.  The sheriff sale count was still significant, 
but the coefficient dropped from almost 3 percent to 2.3 percent.  Homebuyers in 
Cleveland do not view foreclosures as a negative externality. 
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 This finding can lead to several possible conclusions.  The first is that buyers in 
Cleveland do not see nearby foreclosures as a risk.  The city has been experiencing 
foreclosures on a regular basis much longer than suburban locales and the presence of 
foreclosures may simply be part of the housing market in Cleveland.  There is also the 
possibility that homes in Cleveland are not as well maintained compared to suburban 
counterparts.  Therefore, when property maintenance suffers towards the end of the 
foreclosure process, it is not as noticeable as in areas where the home maintenance level 
is greater.  A final piece to this puzzle may be that Cleveland homebuyers have less 
information when purchasing a home.  This may be due to less education or less income.  
Also, realtors working on commission may not want to put the same effort into an 
$80,000 home as they would a $200,000 home.  Whatever the reason, the buyer may 
simply not be aware of nearby foreclosures, especially if deferred maintenance is difficult 
to detect.  It is also possible that on average, which is how a regression assesses the 
variables, neighborhoods in Cleveland are beyond the tipping point as to when 
foreclosures negatively impact nearby properties.  From a policy standpoint, it would be 
pertinent to implement policies in Cleveland neighborhood by neighborhood, focusing 
first on neighborhoods not yet past the tipping point.  Stabilizing such neighborhoods 
before they tip should be a priority.  It should also be noted that while foreclosures were 
not found to have a negative impact on property values, there are numerous other ways in 
which foreclosures can negatively impact a neighborhood that are beyond the scope of 
this dissertation.  Along with that, policies should still be undertaken to address the 
foreclosure problem in the City of Cleveland. 
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 The spatial-temporal model with only suburban homes had slightly less 
straightforward results.  The first significant time period in the suburban model is the 91 
to 180 day interval.  However, this variable has a positive coefficient, indicating that 
those foreclosures have a positive impact on sales prices.  The next time period, 181 to 
270 days, is also significant, but negative.  The fourth time period is insignificant and the 
final time period, foreclosures in process longer than a year, is significant with a negative 
sign.  This final coefficient is consistent with the countywide model.  However, the 
coefficient is much larger at 3.1 percent as opposed to 1.7 percent.  The sheriff sale 
variable also has a larger coefficient.  It jumps from just below 3 percent to 4.4 percent.  
The gap between the foreclosure and sheriff sale variables has been diminished.  Despite 
some inconsistencies, the findings from the suburban model indicate that foreclosures 
have a much greater impact on property values in the suburbs.  In fact, coupling the 
suburban model with the City of Cleveland model, foreclosures’ impact on property 
values appears to be more clearly a suburban problem.  Not only is the impact larger 
when considering only suburban homes, but the negative impact occurs earlier.  The 
positive impact is also interesting, indicating that homes in the suburbs in foreclosure 
may actually be assets to neighborhoods early on in the foreclosure process. 
 From this discussion, a return to the two dissertation hypotheses can be made.  
The first null hypothesis stated roughly that foreclosures within the same face block of a 
sold property have no impact on the sales price.  This hypothesis can be rejected.  The 
foreclosure variable in the spatial model was significantly different from zero with a 
negative sign.  The second null hypothesis stated as a property was in the foreclosure 
process longer, there would not be a greater negative impact on the sales price of a home 
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within the same face block.  For Cuyahoga County, this hypothesis can be rejected.  
Properties early on in the foreclosure process had no impact on sales price while 
properties in the foreclosure process for more than a year had a negative impact.  In the 
City of Cleveland, there is a failure to reject this hypothesis.  No impact on sales price 
was seen for any of the foreclosure time categories.  For the suburban model, rejecting or 
failing to reject the hypothesis is not straight forward, but generally, the hypothesis is 
rejected.  However, foreclosures early in the process had a positive impact, which was 
not hypothesized.  The third and fifth foreclosure categories were significantly differently 
from zero with a negative sign, but the fourth category was insignificant.  So while the 
general idea of the null hypothesis can be rejected for suburban properties, the data do not 
follow the alternative hypothesis exactly. 
 To summarize, there are three main conclusions to draw from the findings of this 
dissertation.  The first is that properties post-auction have a greater negative impact than 
properties that are still in the foreclosure process and have yet to be sold at auction.  With 
that being said, foreclosures that drag on a year after the filing also have a significant 
negative impact on property values.  Therefore, policies aimed at ameliorating the 
foreclosure crisis in regards to negative impacts on property values should 1) focus on 
preventing properties from going to auction, 2) reach a remedy to the foreclosure within a 
year of the filing and 3) aim to stabilize blocks that have fewer than three foreclosure, as 
shown in the alternative dummy variable model.  The final conclusion is rather 
interesting considering that foreclosure has largely been seen as an urban problem up 
until the recent crisis.  In terms of the impact on property values, the foreclosure problem 
appears worse in the suburbs than in the central city for the time period of 2006 to 2007.  
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It may also be that the foreclosure problem has become so bad in the central city that it 
can no longer be measured at the parcel level as is done in this dissertation.  While it is 
often difficult to get suburban government officials to work with central city government 
officials, the findings of this dissertation indicate that both groups should come together 
to find appropriate and effective policy measures to combat the foreclosure crisis. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table XIII. Double Log Base Model Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-value Probability 
CONSTANT 6.30949 0.26990 23.38 0.00 
HALFBATH 0.05940 0.00703 8.45 0.00 
FIREPL 0.03430 0.00638 5.37 0.00 
CRAWL -0.12808 0.02141 -5.98 0.00 
SLAB -0.10219 0.01124 -9.09 0.00 
BSMFNSH 0.00432 0.03553 0.12 0.90 
BSMPART 0.01844 0.00801 2.30 0.02 
BUNGALOW 0.10649 0.01505 7.08 0.00 
COLONIAL -0.01499 0.01110 -1.35 0.18 
OTHERSTYLE -0.04712 0.00958 -4.92 0.00 
ASBESTOS -0.12419 0.03061 -4.06 0.00 
SIDING -0.03928 0.00829 -4.74 0.00 
WOOD -0.07515 0.00951 -7.90 0.00 
SALE06 0.09613 0.00575 16.72 0.00 
WINTER -0.05204 0.00905 -5.75 0.00 
SPRING -0.01649 0.00739 -2.23 0.03 
FALL -0.06158 0.00731 -8.42 0.00 
GARATT 0.01069 0.00924 1.16 0.25 
AIR 0.05335 0.00716 7.45 0.00 
PORCH -0.00379 0.00626 -0.60 0.55 
%BLACK -0.00567 0.00034 -16.75 0.00 
%HISPANIC -0.01083 0.00162 -6.66 0.00 
%POVERTY -0.00156 0.00072 -2.17 0.03 
CITYEAST -0.18411 0.03285 -5.60 0.00 
CITYWEST -0.15924 0.03619 -4.40 0.00 
INNER -0.04538 0.02023 -2.24 0.02 
WATER 0.04690 0.02773 1.69 0.09 
IMPDEN -0.00019 0.00004 -4.83 0.00 
LNBED 0.03679 0.01559 2.36 0.02 
LNBATH 0.09706 0.01287 7.54 0.00 
LNSQFT 0.46740 0.01732 26.98 0.00 
LNAGE -0.23240 0.00878 -26.48 0.00 
LNINC 0.14266 0.01929 7.40 0.00 
LNCBD 0.06802 0.02490 2.73 0.01 
LNLOT 0.10833 0.00766 14.14 0.00 
LNHUDEN 0.03566 0.00760 4.69 0.00 
LAMBDA 0.73353 0.01295 56.66 0.00 
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APPENDIX B 
Table XIV. Pseudo-Tobit Model Regression Results, Cuyahoga County Suburbs 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-value Probability 
CONSTANT 11.32666 0.08232 137.59 0.00 
BEDROOMS 0.01899 0.00934 2.03 0.04 
BATHS 0.04680 0.01542 3.04 0.00 
HALFBATH 0.05311 0.01214 4.37 0.00 
FIREPL 0.04114 0.01120 3.67 0.00 
CRAWL -0.08857 0.04628 -1.91 0.06 
SLAB -0.11258 0.01941 -5.80 0.00 
BSMFNSH -0.05822 0.06307 -0.92 0.36 
BSMPART 0.02437 0.01275 1.91 0.06 
BUNGALOW 0.06501 0.02482 2.62 0.01 
COLONIAL 0.00607 0.01922 0.32 0.75 
OTHERSTYLE -0.01415 0.01617 -0.88 0.38 
ASBESTOS -0.21886 0.07226 -3.03 0.00 
SIDING -0.00232 0.01455 -0.16 0.87 
WOOD -0.08234 0.01667 -4.94 0.00 
SALE06 0.08217 0.01111 7.40 0.00 
WINTER -0.07901 0.01540 -5.13 0.00 
SPRING -0.01631 0.01328 -1.23 0.22 
FALL -0.08772 0.01272 -6.89 0.00 
GARATT 0.02871 0.01545 1.86 0.06 
AIR 0.02873 0.01162 2.47 0.01 
PORCH 0.01180 0.01084 1.09 0.28 
AGE -0.00670 0.00061 -10.99 0.00 
%BLACK -0.00467 0.00039 -11.82 0.00 
%HISPANIC 0.00661 0.00743 0.89 0.37 
%POVERTY -0.00381 0.00133 -2.88 0.00 
INNERRING -0.09743 0.02612 -3.73 0.00 
SQFT1000 0.29227 0.01811 16.14 0.00 
INC1000 0.00314 0.00058 5.39 0.00 
CBDMILE 0.00232 0.00398 0.58 0.56 
LOT1000 0.00207 0.00046 4.47 0.00 
HUDEN 0.00002 0.00001 2.47 0.01 
WATER 0.00726 0.05986 0.12 0.90 
IMPDEN -0.00017 0.00007 -2.55 0.01 
FORC1 -0.00804 0.00810 -0.99 0.32 
FORC2 0.01382 0.00819 1.69 0.09 
FORC3 -0.01456 0.00857 -1.70 0.09 
FORC4 -0.00298 0.00939 -0.32 0.75 
FORC5 -0.02738 0.00640 -4.27 0.00 
SHF_CNT -0.04616 0.00605 -7.64 0.00 
LAMBDA 0.50318 0.02356 21.36 0.00 
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Table XV. Dummy Variable Model Regression Results, Cuyahoga County Suburbs 
Variable Coefficient Std.Error z-value Probability 
CONSTANT 11.53656 0.04416 261.24 0.00 
BEDROOMS 0.01869 0.00472 3.96 0.00 
BATHS 0.06010 0.00693 8.68 0.00 
HALFBATH 0.05294 0.00597 8.87 0.00 
FIREPL 0.02811 0.00537 5.24 0.00 
CRAWL -0.09184 0.02225 -4.13 0.00 
SLAB -0.09360 0.00951 -9.84 0.00 
BSMFNSH -0.00563 0.03103 -0.18 0.86 
BSMPART 0.01178 0.00674 1.75 0.08 
BUNGALOW 0.05570 0.01392 4.00 0.00 
COLONIAL 0.02080 0.00947 2.20 0.03 
OTHERSTYLE -0.01958 0.00793 -2.47 0.01 
ASBESTOS -0.06040 0.04101 -1.47 0.14 
SIDING -0.02513 0.00730 -3.44 0.00 
WOOD -0.05237 0.00833 -6.29 0.00 
SALE06 0.05666 0.00537 10.55 0.00 
WINTER -0.06619 0.00829 -7.99 0.00 
SPRING -0.01725 0.00661 -2.61 0.01 
FALL -0.06450 0.00657 -9.82 0.00 
GARATT 0.02412 0.00760 3.17 0.00 
AIR 0.04044 0.00596 6.79 0.00 
PORCH 0.01205 0.00548 2.20 0.03 
AGE -0.00649 0.00031 -20.64 0.00 
%BLACK -0.00528 0.00035 -15.05 0.00 
%HISPANIC -0.00561 0.00436 -1.29 0.20 
%POVERTY -0.00156 0.00085 -1.84 0.07 
INNERRING -0.06358 0.01675 -3.80 0.00 
SQFT1000 0.24843 0.00725 34.25 0.00 
INC1000 0.00155 0.00026 5.99 0.00 
CBDMILE 0.00077 0.00246 0.31 0.75 
LOT1000 0.00152 0.00017 9.01 0.00 
HUDEN 0.00000 0.00000 0.25 0.80 
WATER 0.07138 0.02238 3.19 0.00 
IMPDEN -0.00011 0.00005 -2.13 0.03 
D11 -0.00530 0.00874 -0.61 0.54 
D12 -0.00672 0.02043 -0.33 0.74 
D13 0.00091 0.04473 0.02 0.98 
D21 0.01295 0.00879 1.47 0.14 
D22 0.02801 0.02139 1.31 0.19 
D23 0.09390 0.04503 2.09 0.04 
D31 -0.00016 0.00924 -0.02 0.99 
D32 -0.05506 0.02297 -2.40 0.02 
D33 -0.05950 0.04961 -1.20 0.23 
D41 -0.01950 0.01007 -1.94 0.05 
 131 
D42 0.02994 0.02658 1.13 0.26 
D43 0.00271 0.05579 0.05 0.96 
D51 -0.03342 0.00866 -3.86 0.00 
D52 -0.06209 0.01617 -3.84 0.00 
D53 -0.12455 0.02890 -4.31 0.00 
D54 -0.12530 0.03893 -3.22 0.00 
SHF_CNT -0.04423 0.00446 -9.91 0.00 
LAMBDA 0.75153 0.01309 57.43 0.00 
                                                            
